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SHORTSIGHTED RESPONSE TO REVERSE PAYMENTS: HOW THE
THIRD CIRCUIT MAY CAUSE CONSUMERS TO “PAY FOR THE
DELAY” OF NEW DRUG DEVELOPMENT
JUDE STEININGER *
“The premise of laws against copying, however, is that humanity’s
innate or socially determined desire to create is simply not enough in a
modern innovation-based economy. To have sustained innovation—
and to do so in areas that require significant investments of time and
money—it is necessary to have a reliable expectation of economic
reward.” 1
I.

INTRODUCTION

Almost everyone, at some point in his or her life, has been affected by
pharmaceutical innovation. 2 Whether it was as minor as needing cough
medicine from your local pharmacy or as severe as needing medications to
survive an operation, nearly everyone can relate. 3 Often, trivial sickness comes
and goes without real consideration for the resources needed to create the
prescription drugs necessary to cure the illness. 4 Recently an issue has
developed that has the capacity to affect our medical landscape and threaten
drug innovation in the future. 5
* Villanova University School of Law, J.D. Candidate 2014; Pennsylvania State
University Smeal College of Business, B.S. Economics 2011. I would like to thank my fellow
editors on the Villanova Law Review for their helpful feedback throughout this process. I
would also like to thank my mother, Mary Beth Steininger, for her unwavering support
throughout my academic career.
1. Chris Sprigman, Does Copying Kill Creativity?, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY BLOG (Sept.
26,
2012),
http://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/the-knockoff-economy/201209/doescopying-kill-creativity.
2. See JACK A. MEYER, ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION:
A
COMPREHENSIVE
FRAMEWORK
8
(2002),
available
at
http://www.scribd.com/doc/7074694/Assessing-the-Impact-of-Pharmaceutical-Innovation-AComprehensive-Framework (scanning wide variety of multiple health condition
improvements that have resulted from pharmaceutical innovation). Studies have shown that
certain innovative drug developments have shown positive health benefits that coincide with a
reduction in health costs. See id. (asserting positive impact on health and economics provided
through drug innovation).
3. See CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, THERAPEUTIC DRUG USE
(2011), http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/drugs.htm (stating statistical data of therapeutic drug
use from 2005–2008).
4. See Michael Dickson & Jean Paul Gagnon, The Cost of New Drug Development and
MEDICINE
(June
20,
2009),
Discovery,
DISCOVERY
http://www.discoverymedicine.com/Michael-Dickson/2009/06/20/the-cost-of-new-drugdiscovery-and-development/ (discussing high costs involved with creating medications).
Drug discovery and development usually costs the pharmaceutical companies hundreds of
millions of dollars. See id. (explaining incredibly high costs involved in drug innovation and
development).
5. See Reverse-Payments Ban Dropped: What’s at Stake for Pharma and Consumers,
INTEGRATED
COMMUNICATIONS,
MAKOVSKY

(88)
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This issue derives from the 1984 legislation known as the Hatch-Waxman
Act. 6 Congress sought to create a mechanism that would allow for a greater
influx of generic alternatives in the pharmaceutical marketplace. 7 Through this
legislation, generic manufacturers were provided an abbreviated application
process for seeking Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approval of a
bioequivalent alternative to a formerly patented drug. 8
In response to the ensuing challenges, branded pharmaceutical corporations
sought out settlements that would help reinforce their exclusionary patent
rights. 9 The resulting agreements became known as pay-for-delay, or reverse
payment settlements. 10 Essentially, the generic challenger agrees to keep their
generic alternative off the shelves in return for payments from the patent
holder’s future profit margin. 11 The resulting monopolistic effects have led to
pharmaceutical wholesalers and retailers taking legal action. 12 Claiming
antitrust violations under Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, these parties
allege that reverse payment settlements cause an unreasonable restraint of trade
in the pharmaceutical industry. 13
Over the past decade, multiple circuit courts have struggled to formulate a
consistent method of examining these settlements. 14 Recently a Third Circuit
http://www.makovsky.com/insights/strategies/reverse-payments-ban-dropped (last visited Oct.
10, 2012) [hereinafter Reverse-Payments Ban Dropped] (asserting strong concern for future
pharmaceutical innovation).
6. See Henry N. Butler & Jeffrey Paul Jarosch, Policy Reversal on Reverse Payments:
Why Courts Should Not Follow the New DOJ Position on Reverse-Payment Settlements of
Pharmaceutical Patent Litigation, 96 IOWA L. REV. 57, 63 (2010) (explaining that reverse
payment settlements occur in setting of Hatch-Waxman Act).
7. See Gregory Dolin, Reverse Settlements as Patent Invalidity Signals, 24 HARV. J.L.
& TECH. 281, 283 (2011) (asserting first goal of Hatch-Waxman Act to be increasing amount
of lower cost generic drugs available to general public).
8. See In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 203 (3d Cir. 2012) (explaining shortform application process offered to generic manufacturers through Hatch-Waxman Act).
9. See Scott Hemphill, Paying for Delay: Pharmaceutical Patent Settlement as a
Regulatory Design Problem, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1553, 1553 (2006) (asserting that in past
decade pharmaceutical drug makers have turned to reverse payment settlements to end
litigation in this area).
10. See Kendyl Hanks et al., “Pay-for-Delay” Settlements: Antitrust Violation or
Proper Exercise of Pharmaceutical Patent Rights?, BUS. L. TODAY 1, 1–2 (2011), available
at http://apps.americanbar.org/buslaw/blt/content/2011/01/article-hanks.pdf (explaining that
these settlements are known as reverse payment settlements or pay-for-delay settlements).
11. See Christopher M. Holman, Do Reverse Payment Settlements Violate the Antitrust
Laws?, 23 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 489, 494–95 (explaining mechanics
of reverse payment settlements); see also Steven W. Day, Leaving Room for Innovation:
Rejecting the FTC’s Stance Against Reverse Payments in Schering-Plough v. FTC, 57 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 223, 230 (2006) (discussing payment from patentee to alleged infringer).
12. See K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 208 (discussing private claim brought by wholesalers and
retailers). The plaintiffs stated, “On April 14, 2008, the Special Master certified a class of
plaintiffs consisting of forty-four wholesalers and retailers who purchased K-Dur directly
from Schering.” Id.
13. See Butler & Jarosch, supra note 6, at 60 (asserting that claims brought against
reverse payment settlements are alleged violations of Sherman Act). The claims allege that
the reverse payment settlements unreasonably restrain trade therefore violating section one of
the Sherman Antitrust Act. See id.
14. See, e.g., In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323 (Fed.
Cir. 2008); In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187 (2d Cir. 2006); In re
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decision has further substantiated an evident circuit split. 15 The inconsistency
in reverse payment analysis calls for Supreme Court intervention, and without
the appropriate clarification, the pharmaceutical industry could suffer
detrimental consequences. 16
Part II of this Note explains the legislation of the Hatch-Waxman Act
(Act), its purpose, and the mechanics that led to the resulting reverse payment
settlements. 17 Part III surveys the landscape of prior case law throughout the
circuit courts. 18 Part IV discusses the recent Third Circuit decision in In re KDur Antitrust Litigation that has rekindled the Hatch-Waxman debate. 19 Part V
analyzes the policy concerns advanced by opposing sides of the argument and
the economic fallout likely to result. 20 Finally, part VI concludes with the
assertion that the Supreme Court must intervene and establish the most
beneficial standard of analysis for reverse payment settlements. 21
II. THE HATCHING OF A PROBLEMATIC ACT
The legislation of the Hatch-Waxman Act has sparked a heated debate in
the pharmaceutical industry. 22 Congress acted in an attempt to counter the high
prices of pharmaceuticals, and their decision has further endangered medical
consumers. 23 A thorough examination of the motivations of the Act, the
functionality of the Act, and the resulting litigation, leads to the logical
conclusion that efficient and effective reform is essential. 24
Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896 (6th Cir. 2003); Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva
Pharms. Inc., 344 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2003); Andrx Pharms., Inc. v. Biovail Corp. Int’l, 256
F.3d 799 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
15. See K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 197 (holding reverse payments to be prima facie evidence
of illegality).
16. See Aaron Barkoff, Third Circuit Issues Landmark Decision in Reverse Payment
Case, Setting Up Supreme Court Review, ORANGE BOOK BLOG (July 17, 2012),
http://www.orangebookblog.com/2012/07/3rd-circuit-issues-landmark-decision-in-pay-fordelay-case-setting-up-supreme-court-review.html (asserting likely Supreme Court intervention
to resolve conflict); cf. Reverse-Payments Ban Dropped, supra note 5 (explaining detrimental
effects that will likely result from banning reverse payment settlements).
17. For an examination of the legislation, purpose, and results of the Hatch-Waxman
Act, see infra notes 25–50 and accompanying text.
18. For an overview of previous case law developed in other circuit courts, see infra
notes 51–71 and accompanying text.
19. For an examination of the recent Third Circuit opinion, see infra notes 72–118 and
accompanying text.
20. For an analysis of the policy concerns advanced by different circuit courts and the
economic consequences likely to result from each approach, see infra notes 119–210 and
accompanying text.
21. For concluding remarks and a brief assertion of the analysis needed to derive the
best long-term effects, see infra notes 211–17 and accompanying text.
22. See Dolin, supra note 7 at 283 (discussing how reverse payment agreements have
developed as result of Hatch-Waxman incentives).
23. See id. at 286 (explaining Congress’s intent to bring lower cost generic drugs into
market). But see Reverse-Payments Ban Dropped, supra note 5 (discussing innovative
consequences likely to be seen following ban of reverse payment settlements).
24. See Reverse-Payments Ban Dropped, supra note 5 (asserting strong concern for
push to end reverse payment settlements and need for proper resolution). For further
discussion of the Act’s functionality and effects, see infra notes 25–50 and accompanying
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A. Enactment of the Hatch-Waxman Act as an Attempt to Counter High
Market Prices
The issue of reverse payment settlements has its origins in the enactment of
the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act, commonly
known as the Hatch-Waxman Act. 25 As a response to the high consumer costs
experienced in the pharmaceutical industry, this legislation was proposed to
encourage and increase the availability of generic alternatives to branded
pharmaceutical medications. 26 Congress formed the Hatch-Waxman Act,
attempting to achieve three main objectives with the new application and
approval process. 27
First, Congress looked to expedite the process of bringing cheaper generic
alternatives into the market by streamlining the procedure for filing a patent
challenge. 28 Second, the Act was created to incentivize drug manufacturers to
focus more on new drug development. 29 Finally, Congress intended for the Act
to assist in clearing the landscape of invalid patents. 30 Congress attempted to
strike the precise balance between encouraging pharmaceutical innovation and

text.
25. See Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act, Pub. L. No. 98-417,
98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (explaining legislation known as Hatch-Waxman Act and how
amendments work); see also Dolin, supra note 7, at 283 (discussing rise of reverse payment
settlements as consequence of incentives that derive from Hatch-Waxman Act).
26. See Butler & Jarosch, supra note 6, at 63 (asserting that Hatch-Waxman Act sought
to provide greater incentives for generic companies to market generic versions of drugs
available from higher priced pharmaceutical companies); see also FED. TRADE COMM’N,
PAY-FOR-DELAY: HOW DRUG COMPANY PAY-OFFS COST CONSUMERS BILLIONS 2 (2010),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2010/01/100112payfordelayrpt.pdf [hereinafter PAY-FORDELAY] (stating that pay-for-delay settlements cost American consumers 3.5 billion dollars
every year). For further discussion of the economic impact of the act and the resulting
consequences, see infra notes 158–210 and accompanying text.
27. See Dolin, supra note 7, at 286–87 (suggesting that enactment of Hatch-Waxman
Act looked to achieve several purposes by streamlining approval process for generic
alternatives to patented medications). For further discussion of the objectives sought through
this Act, see infra notes 51–71 and accompanying text.
28. See In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 203 (3d Cir. 2012) (explaining that
Congress hoped to jump-start generic entry into market by passing Hatch-Waxman Act).
Congress used the new act to allow for an abbreviated application process for FDA approval.
See id. (explaining process in place with Hatch-Waxman Act that allows for Abbreviated New
Drug Applications); see also Dolin, supra note 7, at 286–87 (suggesting three objectives that
Congress had anticipated achieving with legislation of this Act).
29. See Scott A. Backus, Reversing Course on Reverse Payment Settlements in the
Pharmaceutical Industry: Has Schering-Plough Created the Blueprint for Defensible Antitrust
Violations?, 60 OKLA. L. REV. 375, 380 (2007) (discussing that first reason for HatchWaxman Act is to induce pharmaceutical firms to effectively invest in research and
development of new drugs); Reza Bagherian, The Preserve Access to Affordable Generics
Act: Will Congress’s Response to Reverse Payment Patent Settlements Enhance Competition
in the Pharmaceutical Market?, 7 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 150, 152 (2007)
(discussing hope that Act would result in new expenditures into research and development of
certain products for market).
30. See Dolin, supra note 7, at 286–87 (asserting that final goal of Hatch-Waxman Act
was to help clear out invalid patents). The Act looked to encourage litigation over the patents
protecting these pharmaceutical drugs. See id. (explaining how Act would result in
eliminating invalid patents).
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ensuring fair competition. 31
With this delicate equilibrium in mind, Congress included a 180-day
exclusivity period, allowing an exclusive right to sell for the first generic
challenger who brought forward a drug sufficient to enter the market. 32
Congress utilized this exclusivity period in the hope that it would incentivize a
greater influx of generic challengers. 33 While on its face the enticement seems
likely to produce the sought-after balance of innovation and competition, the
functionality of the exclusivity period, and the Act as a whole, has actually
resulted in the anticompetitive issues at hand. 34
B. The Hatch-Waxman Process and Functionality
With the enactment of the 1984 Hatch-Waxman Act, generic companies
were given a procedure that allows patent challenges to accelerate through the
application process by making use of an Abbreviated New Drug Application
(ANDA). 35 The procedure begins by a generic manufacturer seeking FDA
approval of a new generic medication through the filing of the ANDA. 36 The
generic drug manufacturer asserting the ANDA must certify that one of the
following four conditions are met: (1) no patent related to the pioneer drug has
been filed; (2) the relevant patent has expired; (3) the patent will expire on a
certain date; or (4) the patent is invalid or will not be infringed by the
manufacture, use, or sale of the generic drug entity. 37 Most Hatch-Waxman
litigation and resulting reverse payment settlements arise when the challenger
31. See Backus, supra note 29, at 380 (explaining that Hatch-Waxman Act emerged
from Congress hoping to balance two conflicting policy issues).
32. See K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 203–04 (explaining that first challenger to bring forward
generic medication suitable for market will be allowed 180-day exclusivity period). The FDA
agrees to not approve another Abbreviated New Drug Application in the 180 days following
the marketing of the first generic drug. See id. (discussing protocol that will follow from
successful patent challenge and exclusivity benefit first company will receive).
33. See id. at 204 (suggesting that first challenger to patent medication will then be
most motivated due to this exclusivity period); see also Hemphill, supra note 9, at 1579
(stating that reward for generic company that successfully challenges patent on major drug
can be worth several hundred million dollars).
34. See K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 203–04 (explaining that if first filer either settles, loses, or
withdraws, subsequent filers will not be awarded this 180-day exclusivity period). This
results in only the first filer having any real motivation to go through with challenging the
patent. See id. (discussing heightened motivation from first challenger as opposed to any
subsequent challengers); see also Hemphill, supra note 9, at 1588–91 (explaining that
resulting settlement between pharmaceutical company and first generic manufacturer will
likely end up dividing profits from remaining term of patent between two parties).
35. See K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 203 (explaining process put in place following enactment
of Hatch-Waxman Act amending Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act). This short-form
application allows reliance on the FDA’s prior consideration of safety and efficacy regarding
the patented drug. See id. (explaining how new ANDA utilizes FDA’s prior considerations to
expedite approval process); see also Hanks et al., supra note 10, at 1–2 (asserting that HatchWaxman Act allowed for generic manufacturers to file ANDA prior to expiration of patent
rights without automatically triggering infringement).
36. See K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 203 (explaining that new application process begins with
filing ANDA).
37. See 21 U.S.C.A. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii) (West 2012) (explaining four options
available).
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files a paragraph four certification. 38
Once the generic manufacturer files the ANDA, it is required to notify the
patent holder of the application and certification under paragraph four. 39 A
forty-five day patentee response period follows, which allows the challenged
pharmaceutical company to file an infringement claim automatically staying the
ANDA approval process. 40 When a conclusion is reached, or the stay is
concluded, the first ANDA filer receives their 180-day exclusivity period as
long as there is no failure to market their product. 41 Pharmaceutical companies
have responded by settling cases, effectively allowing them to maintain their
patent rights and eliminate the exclusivity period privilege using the failure to
market provision. 42
C. Reverse Payment Settlements as a Controversial Solution
Pharmaceutical companies often respond to Hatch-Waxman litigation by
settling prior to the generic drug entering the market. 43 While settlements are a
38. See K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 203 (stating that generic company at issue in present case
used paragraph four certification, causing issue at hand); cf. Butler & Jarosch, supra note 6, at
64 (explaining that nearly all reverse payment settlements ultimately stem from challengers
using fourth option for certification).
39. See Backus, supra note 29, at 382–83 (explaining that generic manufacturer must
provide notice). Further, the notice must provide a detailed statement of factual and legal
grounding for the claim that the patent is either invalid or will not be infringed. See id.
(describing what information notice must contain in order to give proper warning); see also
Brian Range, The ANDA Patent Certification Requirement and Thirty-Month Stay Provision:
Is it Necessary? 2 (2001) (unpublished third year paper, Harvard Law School), available at
http://leda.law.harvard.edu/leda/data/355/Range.pdf (noting that generic filer of ANDA under
paragraph four must notify patent holder of challenge); cf. Bagherian, supra note 29, at 153
(stating that generic manufacturer must notify patent holder of intent to enter market).
40. See K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 203–04 (explaining that filing suit will result in automated
stay preventing FDA approval for thirty months or until conclusion of court hearing).
Following 2003 amendments to the Act, only one thirty-month stay is allowed in an attempt to
prohibit strategically delaying a resolution. See id. (stating that automated stay is in effect for
thirty months or until resolution is reached); cf. Dolin, supra note 7, at 292 (discussing that
only one thirty month stay is available to avoid over-extending postponement of resolution).
41. See Wansheng Jerry Liu, Balancing Accessibility and Sustainability: How to
Achieve the Dual Objectives of the Hatch-Waxman Act While Resolving Antitrust Issues in
Pharmaceutical Patent Cases, 18 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 441, 453 (2008) (explaining that
under new provisions, 180-day exclusivity period can be forfeited if first ANDA filer fails to
market their generic version of patented drug prior to expiration dates).
42. See Matthew Avery, Continuing Abuse of the Hatch-Waxman Act by
Pharmaceutical Patent Holders and the Failure of the 2003 Amendments, 60 HASTINGS L.J.
171, 191 (2008) (describing loophole that has allowed pharmaceutical companies to utilize
settling as tool to not only keep their patent rights alive, but also to eliminate incentive for
subsequent generic manufacturer). Whether the generic company ends up losing the
exclusivity period or not, the pharmaceutical company effectively eliminates the incentive in
place. See id. at 192 (explaining that if generic manufacturer forfeited exclusivity period, then
subsequent generic challengers do not have access to exclusive selling rights because they are
only offered to first ANDA filer). Once the exclusivity period is not utilized, the generic
manufacturer will forfeit the rights through the seventy-five day marketing provision put in
place. See id. (explaining that if generic manufacturer does not market drug within seventyfive days, exclusivity period is forfeited and therefore eliminated for subsequent challengers).
43. See Hemphill, supra note 9, at 1553 (suggesting that challenging party often
abandons suits that would likely increase competition, thus resulting in more settlements).
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common resolution to patent claims, reverse payment settlements have come
under scrutiny because they result in patent holders paying to keep alternative
drugs off the shelves. 44 This ingenious approach allows pharmaceutical
companies to maintain patent rights for the relatively small price of sharing a
designated amount of profits with the opposing generic producer.45
Furthermore, the resolution eliminates any incentive for subsequent challengers
to come forward with true intentions of entering the market because the
exclusivity period is only granted to the first ANDA filer. 46
These reverse payment settlements have been criticized for having
anticompetitive effects in the pharmaceutical industry. 47 Wholesalers and
manufacturers have begun filing class action claims against the settling parties
These claims assert that the alleged
involved in the agreements. 48
anticompetitive consequences drive industry prices up and negatively affect
consumer welfare. 49 The resulting litigation has left the circuit courts in

44. See Dolin, supra note 7, at 293 (explaining that reverse payment settlements are
unusual in that alleged infringing party receives payment and patent holder maintains patent
rights). About forty-five percent of settlements in this area of law result in such payments.
See id. (discussing statistics of settlements in relevant types of cases and prevalence of reverse
payments in such settlements); cf. The Legality of “Reverse Payments”, ANTITRUST
COUNSELOR (Am. Bar Ass’n) (2010), at 1 (expressing that sometimes these reverse payment
settlements keep generic drugs out of market).
45. See Scott Bergeson, A Vaccine Approach to the Reverse Payment Illness, 18 RICH.
J.L. & TECH. 14, *2 (2012) (explaining that instead of risking financial benefits of losing their
patent rights, pharmaceutical companies pay generic companies portion of profits in order to
keep stronghold on monopolistic benefits of patent).
46. See id. at *4 (expressing further concern that this result eliminates exclusivity
incentive for successive challengers); see also Dolin, supra note 7, at 292–93 (explaining that
generic company can settle with patent holder, while still receiving financial benefits of
exclusivity period).
47. See Backus, supra note 29, at 375 (asserting that FTC found reverse payment
settlements to unfairly restrict generic entry into marketplace); see also Ian Y. Liu & Rebecca
McNeill, The Pay-for-Delay Dilemma: Changes and Challenges Are on the Horizon for
Innovative Pharmaceutical Companies, PHARMACEUTICAL FORMULATION & QUALITY 14
(2011), available at http://www.nxtbook.com/nxtbooks/wiley/pfq_20110607/ (explaining that
pay-for-delay settlements are controversial business practice).
48. See generally In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197 (3d Cir. 2012)
(summarizing claim that reverse payment settlement agreement between pharmaceutical
company and generic manufacturer was anticompetitive in nature); see also In re
Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (analyzing
whether similar settlement illegally restricted competition); In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust
Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 194 (2d Cir. 2006) (discussing settlement involving license to sell
unbranded version of pertinent drug, along with cash payment in return for staying out of
market); In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896 (6th Cir. 2003) (discussing reverse
payment settlement); Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharms, Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1298–1300
(11th Cir. 2003) (analyzing settlement involving payment of substantial sums from patent
holder to generic manufacturer); Andrx Pharms., Inc. v. Biovail Corp. Int’l, 256 F.3d 799
(D.C. Cir. 2001) (discussing settlement involving reverse payments).
49. See, e.g. K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 207–08 (explaining wholesalers and retailers brought
suit against settling parties involved in K-Dur 20 generic alternatives); see also Butler &
Jarosch, supra note 6, at 60 (discussing how challenges have been brought by both FTC and
private litigants); cf. Michael A. Carrier, Unsettling Drug Patent Settlements: A Framework
for Presumptive Illegality, 108 MICH. L. REV. 37, 50 (2009) (asserting that reverse payment
settlements can cost consumers upwards of thirty-five billon dollars over ten years).
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disarray, searching for the appropriate resolution to these disputes. 50
III. A CIRCUIT COURT PRECEDENT IN DISARRAY
Although each settlement resulting from Hatch-Waxman challenges may
differ in terms, the antitrust questions that arise are always a consequence of the
underlying reverse payments. 51 The circuits that first addressed the issue
analyzed the relevant settlements under strict antitrust scrutiny, essentially
creating a presumption of illegality. 52 More recently, circuit courts have
departed from the strict scrutiny approach, shifting towards a “scope of the
patent” test. 53 This method of examination attempts to determine whether the
pertinent settlement exceeds the exclusionary scope of the related patent. 54 The
conflict in analytical approaches has created a muddled precedent in need of
Supreme Court intervention. 55
A. The D.C. and Sixth Circuits Put a “Per Se” Stop to Reverse Payment
Settlements
In 2001, the D.C. Circuit handed down the first decision pertaining to
reverse payment agreements. 56 The court considered an arrangement that

50. See K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 209 (discussing different approaches taken by five previous
circuit courts that have weighed in on issue); see also Butler & Jarosch, supra note 6, at 66
(describing conflicting approaches by different circuits resulting in circuit split); Hanks et. al,
supra note 10, at 2 (explaining that as result of conflict over reverse payment settlements, split
among circuit courts has emerged).
51. See Dolin, supra note 7, at 294 (explaining how settlements may have different
terms, but there are common features in reverse payments).
52. See K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 209 (discussing first two circuits to address issues and
analysis that were used in reaching conclusion); Cardizem, 332 F.3d 896 at 908 (holding that
reverse payment settlement was per se illegal restraint of trade); Andrx, 256 F.3d at 813
(holding that reverse payment was prima facie evidence of illegality of agreement).
53. See, e.g., Ciprofloxacin, 544 F.3d at 1336 (holding that inquiry is whether
agreements restrict competition beyond scope offered through protection of patent);
Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d at 213 (holding that there is no cognizable injury as long as restraints are
within scope of patent).
54. See K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 209 (explaining change in approach that has developed
with latter three circuit decisions involving reverse payment settlements); Ciprofloxacin, 544
F.3d at 1336 (holding that inquiry is whether agreements restrict competition beyond scope
offered through protection of patent); Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharms. Inc., 344 F.3d
1294, 1311 (11th Cir. 2003) (holding that analysis should be whether any part of agreement
went beyond protections provided by issued patent); Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d at 213 (holding that
there is no cognizable injury as long as restraints are within scope of patent).
55. See K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 209 (explaining how approach taken by circuit courts had
changed from presumed illegality to scope of patent inquiry); see also Bernard Persky &
Morissa Falk, Reverse Payment Settlements: The Time for Change has Arrived, 3
L.
REP.
1,
5–6
(2010),
available
at
BLOOMBERG
http://knowledgenetwork.labaton.com/upload/Reverse-Payment-Settlements-The-Time-forChange-has-Arrived.pdf (explaining possibility for Supreme Court or congressional
intervention resulting from circuit split).
56. See K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 210 (discussing decision in Andrx). See generally Andrx,
256 F.3d 799 (resolving case involving reverse payments to keep generic manufacturer from
entering market while patent litigation ensued).
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effectively extended monopolistic effects by delaying generic entry into the
market until a resolution to the litigation was reached. 57 As a response to this
proposed anticompetitive activity, the D.C. Circuit took the drastic measure of
applying strict antitrust scrutiny. 58 The court held the payment to be prima
facie evidence of an illegal agreement not to compete. 59 This decision
established per se illegality for reverse payments. 60
Affirming the D.C. Circuit’s approach, the Sixth Circuit added to per se
precedent for examining reverse payments. 61 In 2003, the Sixth Circuit
contemplated the first reverse payment settlement that attracted public
scrutiny. 62 The court held that the relevant agreement was “a classic example
of a per se unreasonable restraint of trade.” 63 This decision validated a per se
approach that stood as preliminary legal precedent for reverse payment antitrust
analysis. 64
57. See Andrx, 256 F.3d. at 803 (explaining terms of agreement in question). The
terms of the agreement included payment of forty million dollars per year, paid quarterly,
beginning the day of FDA approval of the generic drug and ending the day that the generic
manufacturer decided to begin selling the new drug. See id. at 803–04 (describing exact
financial terms of agreement and outlining start and end date of payments). The settlement in
Andrx utilized a reverse payment to delay the marketing of the generic medication while the
patent litigation unfolded. See id. (discussing that agreement was in effect until resolution of
litigation, not settlement to litigation).
58. See id. at 813 (implying that ten million dollar quarterly payment induced generic
manufacturer, in this case Andrx, to not enter market when it otherwise would have).
“Andrx’s argument that any rational actor would wait for resolution of the patent infringement
suit is belied by the quid of HMRI’s quo.” Id.
59. See id. (treating payment from patent holder to generic manufacturer as prima facie
evidence of agreement not to compete); see also K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 210 (asserting that Andrx
court found payment to be prima facie evidence of an illegal agreement).
60. See K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 209–10 (discussing first approach of strict antitrust scrutiny
presuming illegality). “Two of those courts—the first two to consider the question—
concluded that such agreements should be subject to strict antitrust scrutiny, at least where the
settling parties attempted to manipulate the 180-day exclusivity period to block all potential
generic competition.” Id. at 209.
61. See In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896, 908 (6th Cir. 2003)
(applying per se illegality to agreement); see also Carrier, supra note 49, at 53 (asserting that
Sixth Circuit would hold agreement to be per se illegal because patent holder not only delayed
entry by challenging generic manufacturer but also delayed all entry of generic alternatives
into market).
62. See generally Cardizem, 332 F.3d 896 (deciding legality of reverse payment
settlement resolving Hatch-Waxman Act dispute); see also Dolin, supra note 7, at 294
(explaining that real reverse settlement landscape began with Cardizem because it was one of
first cases to attract public eye to controversial settlements).
63. Cardizem, 332 F.3d at 908 (quoting court’s reasoning verifying illegality). The
agreement exchanged cash payments in return for the insurance that the generic manufacturer
would stay out of the market, even after receiving FDA approval. See id. at 910 (explaining
that plaintiffs asserted agreement between accused parties and put cash payment into effect
when there was FDA approval, therefore delaying entry of approved generic alternative and
delaying triggering of exclusivity period granted to that company); see also K-Dur, 686 F.3d
at 210–11 (explaining that agreement in Cardizem prevented other generic manufacturers
from entering market by delaying triggering of first filer’s 180-day exclusivity period); cf.
Butler & Jarosch, supra note 6, at 68 (asserting that court found term of agreement ensuring
delay of exclusivity period to be extension of anticompetitive nature, which denied access to
all generic competitors).
64. See Cardizem, 332 F.3d at 907–09 (dismissing all of defendants pro-competitive
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B. Subsequent Circuits Respond by Reversing the Trend of Reverse Payment
Analysis
Following the initial outcry for the illegality of reverse payment
settlements, subsequent circuits diverged from per se analysis. 65 Fortunately, in
a later 2003 decision, the Eleventh Circuit asserted the right to exclude provided
through patent protection. 66 The court emphasized that an agreement
advancing only patent protection could not be per se illegal. 67 Instead, the
inquiry turned on whether the settlement at issue stretched beyond the scope of
the patent, consequently establishing the “scope of the patent” test. 68
Additionally, the Second and Federal Circuits would later add to the
Eleventh Circuit’s precedent by applying a presumption of patent validity when
utilizing the scope of the patent test. 69 The courts advanced a strong judicial
preference for allowing settlement, which outweighed any threat posed by
invalid patents. 70 The courts had begun to clearly deviate from the highly
arguments and declaring per se illegality). The court believed such a settlement could not be
justified through expressing the need to enforce the patent rights because the settlement went
beyond patent enforcement. See id. at 908 (suggesting that it is not fair to describe settlement
as simply enforcing patent rights, rather it was attempt to illegally extend benefits); see also
Dolin, supra note 7, at 295 (explaining Sixth Circuit concluded agreements to be per se
violation).
65. See In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 213 (2d Cir. 2006)
(applying presumption of patent validity); Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharms. Inc., 344 F.3d
1294, 1308 (11th Cir. 2003) (analyzing policy concerns in favor of these settlements); see also
In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
(maintaining scope of patent test as appropriate analysis for reverse payment settlements).
66. See Valley Drug, 344 F.3d at 1305 (asserting that name brand manufacturer had
patent that allowed right to exclude competitors for designated time). The agreement stopped
alternatives from entering the market until after the patent expired. See id. at 1300 (explaining
that agreement between patent holder and generic manufacturer entailed that challenger agree
to not sell or market alternative drug until patent was to expire). Further, the generic
manufacturer agreed to not transfer its rights under the ANDA filing, including the right to the
180-day exclusivity period. See id. (discussing remaining terms of contract that allowed for
patent holder to keep all generic alternatives out of market). In return for agreeing to not enter
the market or waive its ANDA rights, the generic manufacturer was paid in increments based
on an agreed upon schedule. See id. (discussing details of agreement); see also Persky &
Falk, supra note 55, at 5 (discussing three factors involved in determining antitrust liability,
which include patent holder’s right to exclude).
67. See Valley Drug, 344 F.3d at 1301 (discussing district court’s ruling that
agreements were per se antitrust violations of Section 1 of Sherman Act). But see id. at 1306
(reversing district court’s decision). The Eleventh Circuit believed the rationale was flawed
and that the agreements were not per se violations. See id. (asserting that exclusionary effect
of patent must be considered in determining restraint of trade caused by agreements).
68. See id. at 1311–12 (asserting that before applying any range of antitrust analysis,
courts must look to whether agreement goes beyond patent protections). The court here is
explaining that it neither will apply a per se antitrust violation or the alternative rule of reason
analysis provided for antitrust examinations. See id. at 1312 (explaining that antitrust analysis
ranges from per se to rule of reason, but one must first look at scope of patent protection for
reverse payment settlements).
69. See Ciprofloxacin, 544 F.3d at 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (asserting no need to consider
patent validity); Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d at 213 (2d Cir. 2006) (applying assumption of patent
validity).
70. See Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d at 211 (explaining that judicial preference for settlement
counters possibility of weak patents being able to extend their monopoly). The court
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assumptive per se approach; however, this trend would progress no further
following the Third Circuit’s decision in In re K-Dur Antitrust Litigation. 71
IV. IN RE K-DUR ANTITRUST LITIGATION
The recent Third Circuit case In re K-Dur Antitrust Litigation addressed
reverse payment settlements that were a result of challenges to the patent
protecting the technology in the drug K-Dur 20. 72 The Third Circuit’s decision
to retreat back to a per se approach has generated more fear in the
pharmaceutical industry and created a legitimate threat to pharmaceutical
innovation. 73 This substantiation of an evident circuit split validates the need
for Supreme Court intervention and affirms a necessity for a resolution that
allows reverse payment settlements to effectively and efficiently resolve HatchWaxman disputes. 74
A. Facts and Procedure
The issues in In re K-Dur Antitrust Litigation stem from two prior patent
disputes that resulted in reverse payment settlements. 75 K-Dur 20, a drug
explained that the mechanics of the Hatch-Waxman Act offer logical reasons supporting
settlement for both parties involved. See id. at 206–07 (explaining that Hatch-Waxman
litigation encourages both sides to settle). Unlike normal patent infringement cases, HatchWaxman disputes take place prior to any generic investment into the market. See id.
(explaining difference between normal patent infringement cases and Hatch-Waxman cases).
Further, the patentee will not be able to recover any infringement damages if they push the
litigation through. See id. (discussing incentive for pharmaceutical patent holder to settle as
well). Settlement results in financial benefits for generic manufacturers prior to market
investment and guarantees the patent holder that no infringement will take place. See id. at
207 (asserting mutual benefits resulting from settling Hatch-Waxman disputes); see also KDur, 686 F.3d at 214 (stating that Second Circuit determined that risk of weak patents being
extended is counterbalanced by judicial preference for allowing settlement resolutions).
71. See Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d at 212–13 (holding that as long as competition is
restrained within scope of patent, then no injury to market is cognizable under existing
antitrust law). The court reaffirmed the Eleventh Circuit approach and additionally presumed
patent validity. See id. (asserting that patent validity is presumed and will only be questioned
if accessed through fraud); see also Ciprofloxacin, 544 F.3d at 1336 (holding that scope of
patent test is to be applied). “[T]he essence of the inquiry is whether the agreements restrict
competition beyond the exclusionary zone of the patent.” Id. But see K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 214
(holding that scope of patent test improperly restricts antitrust analysis needed to correctly
evaluate reverse payment settlements).
72. See K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 197 (examining reverse payments surrounding patented
drug K-Dur 20).
73. See id. at 218 (holding existence of reverse payments is prima facie evidence of
illegality); cf. Reverse-Payments Ban Dropped, supra note 5 (asserting concerns for future
pharmaceutical innovation).
74. See Liu & McNeill, supra note 47, at 15 (discussing opposing sides of argument
that have been taken).
75. See K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 202 (stating that this case originates from two previous
patent cases involving drug K-Dur 20). Settlement was reached when Upsher filed the first
ANDA seeking approval for a generic version of K-Dur 20, asserting a different chemical
compound make-up. See id. at 205 (explaining first reverse payment settlement involving
Schering’s K-Dur 20 drug). Settlement was also reached when ESI Lederle filed an ANDA
seeking approval of a generic form of K-Dur 20, allegedly utilizing different technology. See
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originally manufactured by Schering-Plough Corporation (Schering), received
the #743 patent for the “microencapsulation” process utilized in the drug. 76
This newly patented development allowed for the slow dispersion of drug
particles over an interval of time. 77 The #743 patent was officially granted on
September 5, 1989. 78 Subsequently, two generic manufacturers brought
challenges against this patent claiming a paragraph IV certification under the
Hatch-Waxman Act. 79
1.

Schering-Upsher Settlement

In August 1995, the generic manufacturer Upsher Smith Laboratories filed
the first ANDA seeking approval for a generic form of K-Dur 20. 80 Providing
a paragraph IV certification, Upsher claimed there was no patent infringement
due to the use of a different chemical make-up in their controlled release
coating. 81 Following Upsher’s vigorous defense, the two parties settled just
hours before the district court delivered a summary judgment decision. 82
The terms of the agreement allowed Upsher to maintain its claim that there
was not patent infringement. 83 Furthermore, Schering included a reverse
payment incentive of sixty million dollars over the course of three years. 84 In
id. (discussing second settlement reached, further delaying generic entry of K-Dur 20 into
market); see also Barkoff, supra note 16 (explaining two settlements at issue in this case were
Schering-Upsher Smith agreement and Schering-ESI agreement).
76. See K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 204–05 (explaining that Patent and Trademark Office
issued patent #743 to Schering following their application to patent microencapsulation).
After clarifying a difference in viscosity levels, the PTO approved a revised application for
patent protection. See id. at 205 (explaining differentiating factor in patent approval was
greater viscosity level as compared to patent #399).
77. See id. (describing process of microencapsulation technique, which allows for slow
dispersion of drug particles); see also RONALD T. DODGE CO., MICROENCAPSULATION,
http://www.microencapsulation.net (last visited Sept. 10, 2012) (explaining process of
microencapsulation).
78. See K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 205 (stating date that revised application was officially
granted patency).
79. For a further discussion regarding the challenges to the #743 patent, see infra notes
80–93 and accompanying text.
80. See K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 205 (explaining that Upsher filed first ANDA paragraph IV
certification and was seeking FDA approval of generic alternative to K-Dur 20); see also
Barkoff, supra note 16 (explaining that Upsher filed initial ANDA, which was shortly
followed by ESI challenges and settlement).
81. See K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 205 (asserting Upsher’s defense to patent infringement was
due to differences in chemical composition of controlled release system).
82. See id. (explaining that agreement was reached in early morning of June 18, 1997,
just hours before district court was to rule on pending motions for summary judgment). “The
settlement was memorialized in an eleven-page short-form agreement dated June 17, 1997.”
Id.
83. See id. (asserting that agreement provided Upsher did not have to concede validity,
infringement, or enforceability of #743 patent).
84. See id. at 205–06 (explaining Schering’s initial down payment was sixty million
dollars over three-year period as well as pending additional payments in smaller sums); see
also Third Circuit Agrees With FTC in Applying Stricter Reverse Payment Settlement Test,
ANTITRUST TODAY, (July 31, 2012), http://www.antitrusttoday.com/2012/07/31/third-circuitagrees-with-ftc-in-applying-stricter-reverse-payment-settlement-test/ (discussing plaintiff’s
argument that sixty million dollars was sham and paid as royalty for exchanged licenses in K-
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return for Schering’s payment offer, Upsher agreed to refrain from marketing
this new generic alternative until September 1, 2001, extending Schering’s
market hold for approximately six more years. 85 An additional term, which the
parties later used to support the legality of the reverse payment, was Upsher’s
authorization of licenses allowing Schering to make and sell products developed
by Upsher. 86 This initial settlement provided Schering a brief window of
security; however, a subsequent challenger would soon follow suit. 87
2.

Schering-ESI Settlement

Shortly after the Schering-Upsher settlement, ESI Lederle (ESI) filed
another ANDA certifying the same absence of patent infringement. 88 ESI
claimed that its generic drug contained different chemical technology. 89 After
Schering’s claim of patent infringement, the two parties decided to mediate, and
eventually settle. 90
The settlement agreement promised ESI a royalty-free license under the
#743 patent starting January 1, 2004, which delayed their entry by almost nine
years. 91 Additionally, Schering agreed to a structured reverse payment of five
million dollars and a successive varying sum based upon the FDA’s
Dur).
85. See K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 205 (explaining that Upsher agreed to stay out of market
with its generic alternative to K-Dur 20 until September 1, 2001). Schering agreed that on
September 1, 2001, Upsher would receive a non-royalty, non-exclusive license under #743
patent to freely sell its generic alternative in the open market. See id. (asserting that Upsher
had availability of open market following conclusion of agreement).
86. See id. at 205–06 (explaining dispute regarding reverse payments from Schering to
Upsher). While the settling parties, as defendants, insisted the payments to be consideration
for the licenses, plaintiffs alleged reverse payments were strictly for delaying market entry.
See id. at 206 (discussing two sides to dispute); see also Third Circuit Agrees with FTC, supra
note 84 (explaining that plaintiffs alleged settlements were scams because they believed
payment was simply to keep generic alternative from entering market and not for reasons
asserted by defendants).
87. See K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 206 (discussing second ANDA filed and resulting
settlement). The Schering-ESI litigation was settled with a similar reverse payment
agreement. See id. (discussing settlement that was reached).
88. See id. (explaining ESI Lederle filed subsequent challenge in December 1995); see
also Paolo Morante & Jarod M. Bona, Third Circuit Rekindles Uncertainty in Patent
Settlements Under Hatch-Waxman Act, DLA PIPER (July 25, 2012), available at
http://www.dlapiper.com/us/publications/detail.aspx?pub=7262 (discussing December 1995
ANDA filing from ESI and resulting litigation).
89. See K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 206 (discussing paragraph IV certification). ESI claimed
its generic alternative used a coating with two different ingredients. See id. (explaining ESI’s
explanation for paragraph IV filing).
90. See id. (explaining that Schering and ESI agreed to court-supervised mediation to
attempt to solve dispute). In the fall of 1996, the two parties attempted to resolve their issues
through mediation and eventually would reach the settlement at issue. See id. (addressing
mediation and results in fall of 1996); see also Barkoff, supra note 16 (explaining that
Schering-ESI dispute ending in settlement).
91. See K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 206 (discussing agreement calling for ESI to be granted
royalty-free license as of January 1, 2004 for patent #743). The product from ESI was then
approved in May 1999, but Schering paid an additional ten million dollars as part of the
agreement between the two parties. See id. (explaining FDA approval of generic alternative,
which would have allowed for generic entry into market if not for settlement with Schering).
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determination of ESI’s ANDA filing. 92 Both the initial Schering-Upsher
settlement and the later Schering-ESI agreement would eventually fall under
scrutiny from both the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and various private
parties. 93
3.

Resulting Litigation

Initially, the FTC brought an action alleging the Schering settlements
unreasonably restrained trade. 94 While the Eleventh Circuit ultimately
dismissed the FTC action, the holding in K-Dur seemed to validate the muddled
circuit split. 95 The Third Circuit’s decision in K-Dur poses a serious threat to
future drug innovation and illustrates the need for Supreme Court
intervention. 96
B. Third Circuit’s Analysis of Reverse Payment Settlements
The Third Circuit began its analysis in K-Dur by surveying the general
landscape of antitrust law. 97 Applying the Sherman Act, the court stated,

92. See id. (discussing structured payments flowing from Schering to ESI if ESI agreed
to stay out of market). Schering paid five million dollars up front and then agreed to pay
anywhere from $625,000 to ten million dollars based upon FDA approval. See id. (explaining
that Schering agreed to pay even more to ESI if generic drug was approved for market by
FDA).
93. See Schering-Plough Corp. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 402 F.3d 1056, 1068–76 (11th
Cir. 2005) (determining legality of settlements at issue in FTC action). The Eleventh Circuit
overruled an FTC ruling claiming the settlements were illegal because they unreasonably
restrained trade. See id. at 1076 (discussing holding of court). “Simply because a brand-name
pharmaceutical company holding a patent paid its generic competitor money cannot be the
sole basis for a violation of antitrust law.” Id. “This alone underscores the need to evaluate
the strength of the patent.” Id. “Our conclusion, to a degree, and we hope that the FTC is
mindful of this, reflects policy.” Id.; see also K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 206–09 (discussing actions
brought by FTC, as well as private litigants in form of wholesalers and retailers).
94. See K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 206–08 (discussing FTC action brought against settlements
prior to private litigants alleging claim). In March 2001, the FTC filed a claim against all
three parties, Schering, ESI, and Upsher, alleging their settlements unreasonably restrained
trade. See id. (asserting FTC’s claims against parties alleging violations of antitrust law); see
also Schering-Plough, 402 F.3d at 1060–62 (examining FTC claims brought against
settlements between Schering and generic competitors).
95. See Schering-Plough, 402 F.3d at 1076 (holding FTC claims did not show
unreasonable restraint of trade); K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 218 (holding private litigants’ claims to
be sufficient to hold Schering’s settlements illegal); see also Barkoff, supra note 16 (asserting
that resulting circuit split will likely result in Supreme Court intervention). Because there
have been disagreements as to what tests to apply, the Supreme Court will likely weigh in to
clarify the appropriate analysis for reverse payment settlements. See id. (discussing
differences in analysis of reverse payments).
96. See K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 214–19 (holding that settlements between Schering and
their generic competitors were illegal due to unreasonable restraint of trade). The Third
Circuit believed that the scope of the patent was insufficient in determining legality of such
settlements. See id. at 214 (discussing disagreement with use of scope of patent test).
97. See id. at 208–09 (discussing general antitrust law and its applications). The
antitrust laws prohibit activity that restrains trade. See id. (discussing basic standard for
antitrust law under Sherman Act). The Supreme Court has read the Act as applying to actions
that only unreasonably restrain trade. See id. (explaining what interpretation of Act has
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“[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy,
in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign
nations, is declared to be illegal.” 98 While the text of the Sherman Act appears
to prohibit any restraint of trade, the Supreme Court has interpreted it to
prohibit only an unreasonable restraint of trade. 99 Furthermore, in analyzing
the reasonableness of an alleged restraint of trade, the court discussed the scope
of inquiry, which ranged from unyielding per se illegality to a more thorough
“rule of reason” examination that utilizes the scope of the patent test. 100
The Third Circuit relied on general antitrust law and reverse payment
precedent to establish the guiding criteria for their analysis of the ScheringUpsher and Schering-ESI settlements. 101 After examining the case law for
reverse payment settlements, the court proposed two options for determining the
validity of the agreements. 102 The court could subject the settlements to strict
antitrust scrutiny with a presumption of per se illegality or it could apply the
scope of the patent test. 103 Ultimately, the Third Circuit contradicted the recent
circuit court trend and refused to apply the scope of the patent test. 104
developed to become).
98. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2004) (explaining activity prohibited by Act); see also K-Dur, 686
F.3d at 208 (quoting Sherman Antitrust Act).
99. See 15 U.S.C. § 1. But see K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 209 (discussing Supreme Court’s
interpretation of Act). “Under a literal reading, this provision would make illegal every
agreement in restraint of trade.” Id. at 208–09. “However, it has not been so interpreted.
Rather the Supreme Court has long construed it to prohibit only unreasonable restraints.” Id.
at 209.
100. See K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 209 (discussing analysis used to examine activity alleged
of unreasonably restraining trade). A rule of reason analysis is traditionally used. See id.
(examining factors considered when determining legality of activity alleged illegal under
antitrust law). Courts have also acknowledged that some activities clearly restrain free trade
and therefore are deemed per se illegal. See id. (stating that courts have held certain activities
per se illegal therefore shifting burden to restraining party); cf. Butler & Jarosch, supra note 6,
at 66 (discussing array of applications when analyzing reverse payments). Some courts have
given reverse payment settlements a heightened level of scrutiny, while others have applied
very little or no antitrust scrutiny. See id. (asserting stark differences in antitrust analysis
applied to reverse payment settlements when examined by different circuit courts).
101. See K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 208–15 (surveying antitrust law along with case law
precedent). The court established antitrust analysis, along with diverging approach taken by
previous circuit court. See id. (examining law that court had to pull from in order to analyze
alleged anticompetitive settlement).
102. See id. at 210–15 (examining previous circuit court precedent that had been
established since enactment of Hatch-Waxman Act). For further discussion of the court’s
options in reviewing the reverse payment settlement, see infra notes 103–04 and
accompanying text.
103. See K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 214 (discussing options of addressing issue at hand). The
court could use the approach taken by the first circuits to handle reverse payments, or side
with the more recent migration towards a scope of the patent test. See id. (explaining
differences in approaches previously used by circuit courts when addressing legality of
reverse payment settlements); cf. Backus, supra note 29 at 405–12 (scanning range from per
se illegality approach, to rule of reason analysis, to hybrid rule of reason application). The
main differences regarding the middle ground approach deals with shifting burden of proof
between claimant and patent holder. See id. at 410–11 (discussing blended quick-look rule of
reason approach).
104. See K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 214 (discussing decision to not apply scope of patent test).
“After consideration of the arguments of counsel, the conflicting decisions in the other
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In disagreeing with the scope of the patent test, the court first took aim at
the presumption of patent validity that corresponds with the assessment. 105
The court’s analysis referred to the high success rates of paragraph IV
challenges under the Hatch-Waxman Act, noting the high percentage of patents
that are eventually determined to be invalid. 106 The court stressed that patents
are a legal conclusion issued by the Patent Office and the judicial system should
play an important role in carefully analyzing the strengths and weaknesses of
these challenged patents. 107 Moreover, the court dismissed the proposition that
subsequent challengers would effectively follow and eliminate weak patents. 108
The Third Circuit contended that the monopolistic profit margin stemming from
reverse payment settlements would allow for the patent holder to pay off
numerous generic manufacturers while still maintaining strong earnings. 109
circuits, the Report of the Special Master, and our own reading, we cannot agree with those
courts that apply the scope of the patent test.” Id.; see also In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride
Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d at 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (concurring with Eleventh and Second
Circuits in applying scope of patent test); In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d
187, 200 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that appropriate approach is to insert scope of patent
examination); Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1298 (11th Cir. 2003)
(applying scope of patent test to reverse payment).
105. See K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 214 (asserting court’s disapproval of scope of patent test).
“First, we take issue with the scope of the patent test’s almost unrebuttable presumption of
patent validity.” Id.; cf. Backus, supra note 29, at 408–10 (discussing proponents for
settlements that support presumption of legality). The presumption of legality in reverse
payment settlements allows for reduced costs and increased efficiency. See id. at 408
(explaining why presumption of legality is sometimes supported). The Eleventh and Second
Circuits applied this presumption of legality. See id. (noting circuit court precedent in support
of this approach).
106. See K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 215 (asserting that generic challenger ultimately prevails
in seventy-three percent of challenges). An FTC study concluded that a high percentage of
challengers are successful in their claims. See id. (discussing court’s disagreement with
allowing presumption of legality); see also FED. TRADE COMM’N, GENERIC DRUG ENTRY
PRIOR
TO
PATENT
EXPIRATION
16
(2002),
available
at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/07/genericdrugstudy.pdf [hereinafter GENERIC DRUG ENTRY]
(examining statistical data regarding challenges by generic manufacturers and results
produced). The generic manufacturers succeeded at a high rate when challenging existing
patent holders. See id. (citing percentages in favor of generic challengers that bring paragraph
IV claims).
107. See K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 214–15 (discussing need for judicial supervision and
intervention when analyzing patents). The court stressed the concern for allowing holders of
weak patents to use their stronger financial position to extend the monopolistic effects of their
patent. See id. at 215 (asserting need for judicial system to play part in limiting monopolistic
abilities of weak patents).
108. See id. (questioning Second Circuit assumption that subsequent challengers would
effectively eliminate weak patents). “We note that the initial generic challenger is necessarily
the most motivated because, unlike all subsequent challengers, it stands to benefit from the
180-day exclusivity period of 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv).” Id.; cf. Dolin, supra note 7, at
292–93 (explaining mechanics of Hatch-Waxman Act, particularly exclusivity period allowed
for first filers).
109. See K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 215 (expressing concern over monopolistic margins that
enable patent holder to pay off series of generic manufacturers challenging patent); cf. Kal
Raustiala & Chris Sprigman, Why Do Patent Holders Sometimes Pay Patent Copiers?,
FREAKONOMICS (July 30, 2012), http://www.freakonomics.com/2012/07/30/why-do-patentholders-sometimes-pay-patent-copiers (explaining gains made from patented drug sales). A
case involving the drug Cipro dealt with an antibiotic that had annual sales exceeding one
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After assessing the policy concerns, the circuit court detailed the test they
would employ and its implications moving forward. 110 The court stressed that
once parties include a reverse payment in a settlement, antitrust analysis is
triggered and the scope of the patent test is not sufficient. 111 Furthermore, the
court concluded that any payment from patent holder to generic manufacturer
must be treated as prima facie evidence of an unreasonable restraint of trade. 112
Ultimately, the Third Circuit regressed reverse payment analysis to an approach
of per se illegality. 113
C. Consequences of the K-Dur Decision Moving Forward
Through the Third Circuit decision in K-Dur, reverse payment precedent
has shifted back towards the per se rule. 114 It has left lower courts with six
circuit court decisions that attempt to advance conflicting policy objectives. 115
This reversion back to per se illegality has endangered business incentives that
patent law uses to drive pharmaceutical innovation. 116 The Supreme Court

billion dollars. See id. (explaining how patent drug sales create margins exceedingly higher
than most reverse payment settlements).
110. See K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 218 (rejecting scope of patent test). “In its place we will
direct the District Court to apply a quick look rule of reason analysis based on the economic
realities of the reverse payment settlement rather than the labels applied by the settling
parties.” Id.
111. See id. at 216–17 (expressing caution to limit K-Dur decision to reverse payments
in this setting). “We caution that our decision today is limited to reverse payments between
patent holders and would be generic competitors in the pharmaceutical industry.” Id.
112. See id. at 218 (asserting reverse payments as prima facie evidence of unreasonable
restraint of trade). “In holding that a reverse payment is prima facie evidence of an
unreasonable restraint of trade, we follow the approach suggested by the DC Circuit in
Andrx . . . .” Id.
113. See id. (holding reverse payments to be prima facie evidence of unreasonable
restraint of trade); cf. Butler & Jarosch, supra note 6, at 66 (examining circuit split over
analyzing reverse payment settlements). The first circuit courts to analyze this issue held
reverse payment settlements to be per se illegal. See id. at 66–67 (explaining per se illegality
and its reinstallment by Third Circuit).
114. See K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 218 (applying per se approach to hold that reverse
payments are prima facie evidence of illegality).
115. See id. (holding reverse payments as prima facie evidence of unreasonable
restraint of trade); In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323, 1336
(Fed. Cir. 2008) (holding that correct application is scope of patent test); In re Tamoxifen
Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 213 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding presumption of patent
validity and applying scope of patent test); In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896,
908 (6th Cir. 2003) (holding reverse payments to be per se illegal); Valley Drug Co. v.
Geneva Pharms. Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1311–12 (11th Cir. 2003) (holding that court should
examine whether agreement went beyond protections afforded by patent in question); Andrx
Pharms., Inc. v. Biovail Corp. Int’l, 256 F.3d 799, 813 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (holding reverse
payments to be prima facie evidence of illegality).
116. See Butler & Jarosch, supra note 6, at 66 (discussing circuit split and policy
objectives driving each position). “On one hand, patents give their holders exclusive rights to
use the patented good, spurring innovation.” Id.; see also Carrier, supra note 49, at 62
(discussing courts’ reasoning to defer to settlements because of innovation). By disallowing
settlement in such cases, the courts could possibly harm innovative incentives by increasing
uncertainty in patent law. See id. (examining impact that courts’ disallowance of reverse
payment settlements could have on pharmaceutical innovation).
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must act to establish clear precedent and allow for reverse payment settlements
to properly resolve patent litigation. 117 The Third Circuit overlooked economic
and policy concerns that must be highlighted in order to ensure that the most
economically effective analytical approach is established for evaluating reverse
payment settlements. 118
V. THIRD CIRCUIT’S “PER SE” APPROACH IS A “PER SE” CONCERN TO THE
FUTURE OF NEW DRUG INNOVATION
To have a comprehensive evaluation of reverse payment settlements, there
must be a detailed examination of both policy incentives and the resulting
economic effects. 119 Circuit court precedent has pitted patent exclusion against
protecting consumer costs. 120 The fallout from each side of the disagreement
carries with it extensive consequences for consumers in the pharmaceutical
industry. 121

117. See Barkoff, supra note 16 (stating that many observers believe Supreme Court
will intervene after K-Dur holding). “Because of the circuit split, many observers believe that
with this case, the Supreme Court will finally address the legality of reverse payment
settlements.” Id.; see also Raustiala & Sprigman, supra note 109 (recognizing likely Supreme
Court intervention). But see Holman, supra note 11, at 573–78 (expressing unlikelihood of
Supreme Court intervention at time of publication). Prior to the Third Circuit’s K-Dur
decision, the scope of patent test was regarded as the likely test moving forward. See id. at
577–78. “Some have implied that, without Supreme Court intervention, the Second Circuit’s
test will essentially be locked in as the law of the land, because defendants will appeal all FTC
decisions to the Second Circuit.” Id.
118. See K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 214–19 (discussing policy concerns driving Third Circuit
approach). The court identified issues regarding consumer protection and patent weakness,
but failed to address innovation incentives provided by patent law. See id. (asserting clear
position against reverse payments without considering positive effects they may have). But
see Dolin, supra note 7, at 318 (discussing problems posed by reverse payment analysis). By
disallowing reverse payment settlements to resolve these issues, exclusion rights offered by
patent law are affected and litigation would increase; therefore, generic entry would be
delayed further and the very purpose of the Act would fail. See id. at 319 (arguing that
disallowance of reverse payment settlements “would push more disputes into litigation where
the outcome is far from certain”).
119. See Backus, supra note 29, at 380 (discussing policy objectives that must be
balanced through Hatch-Waxman resolution). The Act and its results need to weigh the
delicate balance between continuing to encourage innovation, while still bringing cheaper
alternatives into the market. See id. (asserting need to maintain balance and consider both
policy objectives); see also Hanks et al., supra note 10, at 1 (explaining financial impact of
resolution of reverse payment issues). The resolution of the question regarding reverse
payment settlements involves billions of dollars. See id. (showing economic impact of
resolution regarding issue of reverse payment settlements).
120. See Bagherian, supra note 29, at 160–66 (discussing different approaches taken
by courts, such as per se approach, rule of reason analysis, and scope of patent test); see also
Butler & Jarosch, supra note 6, at 86–87 (discussing policy reversal regarding approach to
reverse payment settlements). The analysis gravitated from a per se approach to a more
detailed inquiry known as rule of reason analysis. See id. (noting that policy reversal had
taken place over time).
121. See Hanks et al., supra note 10, at 1 (asserting that reverse payment settlements
protect twenty billion dollars in sales of patented drugs from generic competition). In
addition, “the FTC estimates that reverse payment settlement cost consumers $3.5 billion a
year—or $35 billion over the next 10 years.” Id.
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A. Misguided Policy Objectives Overshadow More Important Innovative
Consequences
The Third Circuit has reignited arguments that do not address the entirety
of the reverse payment settlement issue. 122 While the court concentrated on the
immediate concerns of high consumer costs and weak patents, it failed to
sufficiently examine the more prominent long-term effects on pharmaceutical
innovation and consumer needs. 123 By applying this approach to reverse
payment settlements, courts risk endangering the entire pharmaceutical industry
and creating uncertainty in patent protection. 124
1.

The Per Se Attempt to Eliminate Reverse Payment Settlements

The Third Circuit has rekindled the per se approach, declaring reverse
payments to be prima facie evidence of illegality. 125 The court highlighted
concerns including the high rate of success for generic manufacturers in HatchWaxman litigation, a patent holder’s ability to utilize high profit margins to
forcefully maintain market control, and a divergence from enforcing the very
purposes of the Hatch-Waxman Act. 126 The court asserted the belief that
reverse payment settlements would hamper generic entry and consequently,
consumer costs would continue to increase. 127
According to oppositions of the scope of the patent test, this examination
fails to address the issue of weak or invalid patents because it coincides with a
presumption of patent validity. 128 A Federal Trade Commission (FTC) study
asserted that seventy-three percent of paragraph IV challenges pushed to
122. See K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 214–19 (asserting concerns for high costs and weak
patents).
123. See id. (expressing concern for invalid patents and high costs). But see ReversePayments Ban Dropped, supra note 5 (asserting concerns for more important issues of longterm innovation and consumer welfare in future).
124. See Reverse-Payments Ban Dropped, supra note 5 (insisting that ban on reverse
payment settlements would lead to detrimental effects in entire pharmaceutical industry).
125. See K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 218 (declaring payments from patent holder to challenger
as prima facie evidence of unreasonable restraint of trade).
126. See id. at 215 (citing to FTC conclusions finding generic manufacturer to be
successful seventy-three percent of time). “[T]he high profit margins of a monopolist drug
manufacturer may enable it to pay off a whole series of challengers . . . .” Id. (expressing
concern for patent holder’s ability to pay off multiple challengers, resulting in market hold).
“The goal of the Hatch-Waxman Act is to increase the availability of low cost generic drugs.”
Id. at 217 (asserting goals of Hatch-Waxman Act that have been overlooked recently).
127. See id. at 217 (discussing goal of Act, which is to lower cost). The goal is
undermined by applying scope of the patent test and allowing reverse payment settlements
because it allows patent holder to keep generic alternatives out of the market. See id.
(expressing concern for goals of Act); cf. Hanks et al., supra note 10, at 1 (asserting cost to
consumers caused by reverse payment settlements). The FTC estimated the consumer cost to
be roughly thirty-five billion dollars over the next ten years. See id. (expressing extreme
financial effects).
128. See K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 214–15 (discussing disagreement with assumption of
patent validity). The scope of the patent test had previously been applied by circuit courts
with a presumption of patent validity and the Third Circuit does not agree with such an
approach. See id. (expressing issue based on FTC study showing many paragraph IV
challenges to ultimately be successful).
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litigation are successful; therefore, some courts have highlighted a need for
judicial resolve they felt was necessary to clear the weak patents. 129
Ultimately, courts have taken clear anti-settlement stances at times. 130
2.

A Sufficient Conflict Insufficiently Addressed

While several circuits have encouraged judicial activism in clearing the
patent landscape, those courts have overlooked some important considerations
when applying this per se rule. 131 First, although weak patents may exist, the
regulatory patent process helps to promote innovation and development. 132
The Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) issues patents to parties that have
invested in new inventions, whether in the pharmaceutical industry or any
other. 133 If there is a need for system maintenance, the legislature could take
action to improve the PTO’s effectiveness. 134
When reviewing reverse payments, courts should consider the
anticompetitive effects of the reverse payment, not the strength of the patent. 135
Through judicial activism, the courts will intervene in the patent process and
risk interfering with the agency duties of the PTO. 136 Further, courts are
129. See id. at 215 (citing to FTC study); see also GENERIC DRUG ENTRY, supra note
106 (asserting statistical data showing seventy-three percent of paragraph IV challenges to be
successful). The generic manufacturer had a very high success rate, which would result in
increased generic alternatives if not for reverse payment settlements. See id. (discussing how
reverse payment settlements inhibit generic availability in market).
130. See K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 218 (holding that reverse payment settlement was prima
facie evidence of unreasonable restraint of trade).
131. See Reverse-Payments Ban Dropped, supra note 5 (raising concern about possible
bans on reverse payment settlements). Arguing that future drug innovation from branded
pharmaceutical companies would be endangered and generic companies would be dissuaded
from challenging patents without the option to settle claims prior to expensive litigation. See
id. (expressing concern for branded pharmaceutical companies and generic manufacturers if
reverse payment settlements were banned).
132. See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., PATENTS AND INNOVATION:
TRENDS
AND
POLICY
CHALLENGES
9
(2004),
available
at
http://www.oecd.org/science/scienceandtechnologypolicy/24508541.pdf (discussing patent
system’s ability to foster innovation). “Viewed from the angle of innovation policy, patents
aim to foster innovation in the private sector by allowing inventors to profit from their
inventions.” Id.
133. See K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 215 (explaining that patent is legal conclusion issued by
patent office); see also PATENTS AND INNOVATION: TRENDS AND POLICY CHALLENGES,
supra note 132, at 9 (discussing patents’ purpose of fostering innovation through allowing
inventors to profit from inventions).
134. See Dolin, supra note 7, at 319–20 (discussing current reexamination process in
place for PTO). “After a patent issues, it is presumed valid.” Id. at 319. While reverse
payment settlements avoid litigation and preserve the presumption of validity, the PTO
provides another option for reexamination. See id. (explaining that although court will not
address patent validity if presented with reverse payment settlement, patent can still be
reexamined by PTO).
135. See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2006) (stating that patents shall be presumed valid); see also
Carrier, supra note 49, at 62–63 (discussing presumption of validity previously applied by
courts). The Patent Act states that patents shall be presumed valid. See id. at 62 (explaining
why patents should be presumed valid).
136. See Dolin, supra note 7, at 319 (explaining how antitrust approach to clearing
weak patents is insufficient). “Patent law, the very tool Congress used to create the Hatch-
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muddying the analysis of reverse payment settlements by considering patent
strength or weakness. 137 The court’s departure from a presumption of patent
validity further complicates the issue and likely will cause undesirable
results. 138 An independent examination of the restraint of trade should
determine the validity of reverse payments. 139
Second, the Third Circuit called attention to the high profit margins that
allow patent holders to pay off generic challengers. 140 This may be a plausible
assertion, but the court failed to contemplate the importance of maintaining
Pharmaceutical
these profit margins to ensure future development. 141
companies continue to strive for more innovation because they have the
financial security of patent law. 142 Judicial interpretation of patent strength in
these cases will apply a level of scrutiny that will bring uncertainty to the future
of intellectual property rights. 143 Courts must consider the consequences of
this increased scrutiny. 144
Waxman Act, is a far better instrument to address these issues.” Id.
137. See Carrier, supra note 49, at 63 (discussing mixing of analysis when analyzing
reverse payment settlements). Courts have made it clear that there is no legal support for
public property rights in private disputes and agreements. See id. (explaining that public’s
rights to lower prices should not be considered in private lawsuits). The settling parties in
these cases have no duty to outside public parties to lessen monopolistic effects in the market.
See id. (discussing settling parties).
138. See id. at 63 (explaining courts concern for adverse effects on patent licenses); see
also Bagherian, supra note 29, at 167 (discussing per se approach to ruling settlements invalid
could have chilling effect on patent settlement).
139. See Dolin, supra note 7, at 318–19 (examining tension between antitrust law and
patent law). There is a sharp conflict between a patent’s right to exclude and antitrust issues
under the Sherman Act. See id. (elaborating on conflict between these two areas of law).
140. See In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 215 (3d Cir. 2012) (discussing
policy concerns regarding patent holder’s ability to pay off list of subsequent challengers).
The high profit margins give patent holder opportunity to give up some profits instead of
losing exclusionary rights offered through its patent. See id. (asserting strong concern with
financial position of patent holder).
141. See Hemphill, supra note 9, at 1574–75 (discussing considerations of competition
and innovation). “The innovator’s argument is that a lenient policy toward settlement
increases patentee profits, which preserves and improves the incentive to innovate.” Id. at
1575. This strong preference for promoting innovation should be followed by antitrust law
through allowing a lenient approach to analyzing reverse payment settlements. See id.
(promoting antitrust law’s merging towards favoring settlement).
142. See Holman, supra note 11, at 503–04 (discussing high profitability of branded
drugs). When patent protections cease, profit margins and market share are quickly eroded by
generic entry. See id. at 503 (explaining sharp decrease in value when patent expires). “The
high profitability of branded drugs motivates drug patent owners to take extreme measures to
maintain and enforce their patent rights.” Id. at 503–04.
143. See Hemphill, supra note 9, at 1600–01 (discussing Patent Act). Antitrust
liability is often withheld when dealing in the area of patent protection. See id. (explaining
judicial recognition of patent exceptionalism). Cases dealing with reverse payment
settlements have been sprinkled with notions to withhold antitrust analysis because one party
possesses a patent, which carries with it exclusionary rights. See id. (explaining that antitrust
analysis has often been handled in this area of law).
144. See Butler & Jarosch, supra note 6, at 90 (discussing how reverse payment
settlements allow innovator to increase patent value). “Because reverse-payment settlements
increase the value of the underlying patent to the patent holder, they also increase the brandname company’s incentive to innovate . . . .” Id.; see also Carrier, supra note 49, at 62
(discussing how restricting settlements can lead to more uncertainty for patent holders).
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Finally, the Third Circuit stressed that reverse payment settlements conflict
with the purposes of the Hatch-Waxman Act. 145 Reverse payment settlements
have developed as the most effective solution to Hatch-Waxman disputes
because they benefit both parties involved. 146 These settlements are a
consequence of faulty mechanics and should not be eliminated through judicial
intervention. 147 The effects of the Hatch-Waxman legislation may not have
been as intended but amending the procedure should be left to the
legislature. 148
3. Dependence of Pharmaceutical Innovation on the Proper Resolution to
Reverse Payment Settlements
The policy concerns advanced in K-Dur are important, but they do not fully
encompass the problem. 149 Applying per se illegality to reverse payment
settlements may help clear the landscape of invalid patents and allow for more
generic entry into the market, but it does not address the implications for
innovation. 150 The per se approach fails to consider its long-term effects on

Denying reverse payment settlements will increase uncertainty and delay innovation. See id.
(asserting policy concern).
145. See K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 217 (discussing Hatch-Waxman Act goal of encouraging
more challenges to weak or invalid patents). “One method Congress employed was to
encourage litigation challenges by generic manufacturers against the holders of weak or
narrow patents.” Id.
146. See In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 206 (2d Cir. 2006)
(asserting that Hatch-Waxman Act encouraged reverse payment settlements); see also Day,
supra note 11, at 230 (explaining that some have argued reverse payment settlements
inevitably result from Hatch-Waxman Act). “Others have argued that reverse payments are an
inevitable by-product of the Hatch-Waxman context and so long as the settlement does not
exceed the scope of the patent holder’s right to exclude, reverse payments are acceptable.”
Id.; Raustiala & Sprigman, supra note 109 (discussing how reverse payment is beneficial to
both sides involved). The patent holder keeps market control and the generic competitor buys
itself financial certainty. See id. (elaborating on benefits of reverse payment settlements).
147. See Dolin, supra note 7, at 320–22 (discussing reexamination process and patent
validity determination). If the Patent Office Director determines that a substantial new
question is raised affecting any claim of a patent, then there can be reexamination for
resolution of the question at hand. See id. at 320–21. (explaining process of allowing
reexamination of patent by PTO).
148. See id. at 318 (discussing goals of Hatch-Waxman Act). Antitrust law is an
imperfect tool to address the issue of reverse payment settlements and to advance Congress’s
goals. See id. at 319 (explaining inefficacy of antitrust law in fulfilling congressional intent).
149. See K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 214–15 (discussing policy concerns in favor of per se
approach). “First, we take issue with the scope of the patent test’s almost unrebuttable
presumption of patent validity.” Id. at 214. “[T]he high profit margins of a monopolist drug
manufacturer may enable it to pay off a whole series of challengers rather than suffer the
possible loss of its patent through litigation.” Id. at 215. The court found serious issue in the
alleged ability for would-be competitors to share in monopolistic gains. See id. at 216
(expressing concern for allowing these parties to settle in this manner).
150. See id. at 214–15 (considering policy issues of patent validity and monopolistic
market effects); see also Dolin, supra note 7, at 286–87 (discussing objectives of HatchWaxman Act). The Act attempted to bring a greater amount of lower priced generic drugs to
the market and assist in clearing the landscape of weak or invalid patents. See id. (elaborating
on multiple purposes of Act).
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patent incentives in the pharmaceutical industry. 151
Reducing consumer costs is an issue that should be addressed, but it is
important to maintain patent rights so that the system in place ensures the
medical field will continue to advance. 152 The financial motivations stemming
from patent exclusion rights present pharmaceutical companies with a certain
level of assurance. 153 Without preserving that level of certainty, patent law
will be unable to continue incentivizing pharmaceutical innovation. 154
There is a clear difference of opinion as to what approach is needed to
appropriately resolve the issue of reverse payment settlements. 155 Important
policy concerns have been addressed and contemplated, but all theoretical
declarations remain hollow without concrete analysis to support their claims. 156
Through an economic examination, the per se approach is shown to have
negative consequences over time. 157

151. See Hemphill, supra note 9, at 1562–63 (discussing drug makers’ strong reliance
on profits from patents). “New drugs are developed in anticipation of the profits that patents
secure.” Id. at 1562. The pharmaceutical field faces innovation problems not seen in others
industries. See id. at 1562–64 (discussing cumulative innovation).
152. See id. at 1562–63 (discussing importance of patents in pharmaceutical industry).
“[P]harmaceuticals have been associated with the case for strong patents.” Id. at 1564; see
also Butler & Jarosch, supra note 6, at 90 (discussing increase of patent power equating to
more incentive to innovate). Innovation leads to more consumption, greater profit margins,
and better competition in the pharmaceutical industry. See id. (explaining that competition is
key driver of innovation in pharmaceutical industry).
153. See In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 203 (2d Cir. 2006)
(asserting concerns regarding increased uncertainty and delayed innovation); see also Carrier,
supra note 49, at 62 (addressing previously stated issue of hampering goals of patent system).
The Tamoxifen court noted the increased uncertainty caused by restricting settlements, which
could lead to delayed innovation. See id. (discussing drawbacks to restricting settlements);
Holman, supra note 11, at 503 (asserting pharmaceutical branded companies rely heavily on
protection offered by patents). “[A] branded drug company’s profit margins are to a large
extent dependant upon the market exclusivity provided by patents.” Id.
154. See Josh Bloom, Yes: Innovation Demands It, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 23, 2012),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204542404577156993191655000.html#artic
leTabs%3Darticle (asserting serious need for patent protection and extension). “Without
extended patent protection for new discoveries, the industry won’t be able to fund the current
level of research.” Id.
155. See K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 217 (applying per se approach); In re Ciprofloxacin
Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (applying scope of
patent test with presumption of patent validity); Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d 187, 194 (2d Cir. 2006)
(applying scope of patent test); In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896 (6th Cir.
2003) (applying per se approach); Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharms, Inc., 344 F.3d 1294,
1298 (11th Cir. 2003) (changing analysis to scope of patent approach); Andrx Pharms., Inc. v.
Biovail Corp. Int’l, 256 F.3d 799 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (applying per se approach).
156. See Butler & Jarosch, supra note 6, at 57 (explaining that more detailed analysis is
needed for reverse payment settlements because effects are not obvious); cf. Hemphill, supra
note 9, at 1558 (discussing substantial attention offered to these cases). Economists and legal
scholars devote much analysis to reverse payment settlements in light of their economic
importance and deepening confusion about their resolution. See id. (explaining complex
situation analyzed by scholars and economists).
157. See Butler & Jarosch, supra note 6, at 63 (asserting that application of per se rule
comes with significant risks). “Courts that limit the antitrust analysis of reverse payments by
applying per se rules risk committing significant errors.” Id.
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B. Future Economic Impact of a Resolution to the Reverse Payment Conflict
By applying a per se approach to reverse payment settlements, courts
essentially attempt to eliminate the option to settle in this fashion. 158 Those
supporting a per se approach believe that eliminating these agreements will
result in a greater volume of generic alternatives and consequently lower
consumer costs. 159 Although this argument, on its face, appears to address the
problem of high costs, further economic analysis renders contrary results. 160
Banning reverse payment settlements would have negative effects on branded
pharmaceutical manufacturers’ incentives to innovate, threaten the cash
liquidity positions of generic developers, and dramatically increase the risk of
pursuing a Hatch-Waxman challenge. 161 Reverse payment settlements must be
allowed to continue providing parties with a method of resolution that allows
for future pharmaceutical innovation, generic reinvestment, and long-term
consumer welfare. 162
1.

Problematic, Short-Term Outlook of the Per Se Approach

Supporters of the per se approach to reverse payment settlements look to
consumer protection as their principal argument. 163 Congress enacted the
Hatch-Waxman Act in order to drive pharmaceutical prices down by making
generic alternatives widely available in the marketplace. 164 From an economic
standpoint, the Act attempted to increase the elasticity of demand in the

158. See id. at 66–67 (explaining that per se approach creates irrebuttable presumption
of illegality).
159. See generally K-Dur, 686 F.3d 197 (applying per se approach because of concerns
for weak patents and high costs); Cardizem, 332 F.3d 896 (further affirming per se approach);
Andrx, 256 F.3d 799 (applying per se approach).
160. See Reverse-Payments Ban Dropped, supra note 5 (discussing future concerns
regarding pharmaceutical innovation and generic reinvestment).
161. See id. (explaining negative results derived from trying to end reverse payment
settlements).
162. See Butler & Jarosch, supra note 6, at 125 (asserting concern for presumption of
illegality putting burden on these settlements); see also Reverse-Payments Ban Dropped,
supra note 5 (asserting strong need for reverse payment settlements to ensure continuing
innovation and sustainability of generic companies).
163. See K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 217 (discussing Congress’s intent to protect consumers
from monopolistic activity). The court agreed with Congress that litigation is necessary to
protect consumers from this unjustified monopolistic activity. See id. (explaining Congress’s
intent); see also Liu & McNeill, supra note 47, at 16 (explaining that opponents cite rising
cost of prescription drugs as policy concern). “Opponents cite the ever-rising cost of
prescription drugs as another important policy reason for banning the pay-for-delay practice.”
Id.
164. See Dolin, supra note 7, at 286–87 (explaining objectives sought to be
accomplished through legislation of Act). “First, the Act sought to bring lower-cost generic
equivalents of patented drugs to market on an expedited basis and thus make these drugs more
widely available to the general public.” Id. at 286; see also Bagherian, supra note 29, at 152
(asserting that objective of Act is to make more low-cost drugs available on market).
Congress passed this act with the hope that there would be an increase in expenditures for
research and development to bring generic alternatives to the market. See id. (explaining
incentives meant to be created).
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pharmaceutical market. 165 By offering an expedited procedural process to
generic manufacturers, the legislature assumed more generic alternatives would
flood the market and result in a higher volume of consumer options. 166 The
mechanics of the Act have not produced the intended effect. 167 These faulty
mechanics have developed a scenario in which a reverse payment settlement
offers the greatest net utility to the parties involved. 168 In response, some
courts have tried to vigorously inhibit the availability of this settlement
structure. 169
The circuit courts employing this per se analysis attempt to force
monopolistic activity out of the pharmaceutical marketplace by pushing HatchWaxman disputes to litigation. 170 The FTC and other opponents of reverse
payments see judicial activism as the answer to the misguided Act. 171 By
coupling a push for more litigation with the FTC’s analysis showing a high
success rate in patent challenges, the proponents of a per se approach likely

165. See Dolin, supra note 7, at 286–87 (discussing intention to make generic
alternative more widely available). Congress intended to increase the availability of other
options in the pharmaceutical market, which would in turn lead to lower prices for consumers.
See id. (explaining desired result).
166. See K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 204 (explaining Congress’s intent in enacting HatchWaxman Act); see also H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 1, at 14–15 (1984), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647, 2647–48 (discussing intent to make more low-cost generic drugs
available); Backus, supra note 29, at 380 (explaining Hatch-Waxman Act’s intent to bring
cheaper copies to market).
167. See Hemphill, supra note 9, at 1553–54 (discussing pay-for-delay settlements that
have resulted from Hatch-Waxman disputes). “Over the past decade, drug makers have
settled patent litigation by making large payments to potential rivals who, in turn, abandon
suits that, if successful, would increase competition.” Id. at 1553. “[C]ertain features of the
Act widen, often by subtle means, the potential for anticompetitive harm from pay-for-delay
settlements.” Id.
168. See Buter & Jarosch, supra note 6, at 97–98 (discussing high cost of litigation
lending itself to settlement). Any anti-competitive effects are offset by a net societal gain
experienced through avoiding lengthy and expensive litigation. See id. at 97 (asserting
benefits of these settlements). Aside from cost-saving benefits for parties involved, courts and
society experience gains from settlement as well. See id. (explaining benefits to multiple
parties).
169. See generally In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896 (6th Cir. 2003)
(reaffirming approach taken in Andrx); Andrx Pharms., Inc. v. Biovail Corp. Int’l, 256 F.3d
799 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (holding reverse payment settlements essentially per se illegal); see also
Alyssa L. Brown, Modest Proposals for a Complex Problem: Patent Misuse and Incremental
Changes to the Hatch-Waxman Act as Solutions to the Problem of Reverse Payment
Settlements, 41 U. BALT. L. REV. 583, 595–96 (discussing Sixth Circuit’s initial response
making reverse payment settlements per se illegal).
170. See generally Cardizem, 332 F.3d 896 (reaffirming approach taken in Andrx);
Andrx, 256 F.3d 799 (holding reverse payment settlements essentially per se illegal); see also
Dolin, supra note 7, at 286–87 (asserting that objective of Act is more litigation). “Finally,
the Act, through encouraging litigation over the patents that covered these drugs, sought to
clear the landscape of invalid patents by providing a ‘bounty’ to generics firms that challenged
the validity or enforceability of the patents covering brand-name drugs.” Id. at 286–87.
171. See K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 206–07 (discussing FTC action relating to K-Dur case).
The FTC unanimously overruled the Administrative Law Judge’s ruling that the agreements
were not simply an attempt to preserve monopoly power in the market. See id. at 207
(explaining FTC action clearly showing strong restraint to reverse payment settlements).
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believe their goals for the Hatch-Waxman Act can now be realized. 172
While this line of attack may result in more litigation, an alleged increase
in generic alternatives, and initially lower consumer costs; severe consequences
will likely arise in the pharmaceutical industry. 173 By increasing litigation and,
in turn, possibly decreasing patent effectiveness, this per se approach will be
detrimental to pharmaceutical innovation. 174 Without the certainty provided to
intellectual property through patent law, pharmaceutical companies will find
little economic incentive to continue the expensive research and development
needed to generate new medications. 175
When surveying the effects of this per se approach, courts need to evaluate
the general welfare of society. 176 Although consumer costs will possibly
decrease in the interim, the general welfare of society will be negatively
affected over time. 177 When analyzing the situation, decision-makers should
consider the importance of continued medical innovation and the successes of
new drug development in combating illness. 178

172. See Dolin, supra note 7, at 286–87 (discussing objective pushing for more
litigation relating to pharmaceutical patents); cf. GENERIC DRUG ENTRY, supra note 106, at
viii (explaining high statistical success rate for challenges that move forward to litigation).
173. See Hemphill, supra note 9, at 1562–63 (discussing relationship between
innovation and patent policy). Pharmaceutical companies rely heavily on patent protection to
ensure there will be a financial benefit to drug development. See id. (asserting patent
necessity). “Drug companies, compared to innovators in other industries, cannot as easily rely
upon a head start, complementary assets, and scale of production as means to preserve
profits.” Id. at 1563.
174. See id. (discussing relationship between patent protection and innovation).
“Partly as a result, pharmaceuticals have been associated with the case for strong patents.” Id.
at 1564; see also Mark R. Patterson, Leveraging Information About Patents: Settlements,
Portfolios, and Holdups, 50 HOUS. L. REV. 483 (2012) (explaining recent scholarship bringing
much uncertainty to patent property rights). Uncertainty plays an important role in decision
revolving around patent rights. See id. at 487–95 (discussing uncertainty and patent rights).
175. See Butler & Jarosch, supra note 6, at 90 (discussing relationship between patent
value and future innovation). The brand name pharmaceuticals are able to use reverse
payment settlements to add value to their patent rights and therefore, they are able to invest in
further innovative projects. See id. (asserting strong reasoning for allowing branded
pharmaceutical companies to strengthen patent rights).
176. See id. at 97–98 (asserting important role settlements play in promoting general
welfare). A net societal gain outweighs anticompetitive results that may be a by-product of
the settlement. See id. at 97 (asserting benefits of these settlements). Courts and society in
general experience gains from settlement as well. See id. (explaining benefit to multiple
parties); see also id. at 98 (discussing liquidity cash positions of generic and branded
pharmaceutical companies). Some generic companies are small and have very limited cash,
which results in an undesirable effect from litigation. See id. (describing how forcing
litigation may hurt generic manufacturers).
177. See Reverse-Payments Ban Dropped, supra note 5 (explaining how innovation
that is much needed will likely be negatively effected if reverse payment settlements are
banned); see also Frank R. Lichtenberg, Pharmaceutical Innovation and Longevity Growth in
30 Developing and High-Income Countries, 2000-2009 1–2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working
Paper
Series
No.
18235,
2012),
available
at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w18235.pdf?new_window=1 (explaining direct correlation
between pharmaceutical innovative and life expectancy).
178. See Lichtenberg, supra note 177, at 2 (asserting drug innovation being driving
force in benefiting human life). “Life expectancy at all ages and survival rates above age 25
increased faster in countries with larger increases in drug vintage.” Id.
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Moreover, courts should consider the liquidity of generic manufacturers,
which is scarcely contemplated when analyzing the effects of reverse payment
settlements. 179 Courts may believe that by prohibiting these settlements more
generic alternatives will enter the market, but the effectual results will likely be
quite contrary. 180 A chilling effect could result if litigation is the only option
available for generic challengers. 181 Due to a lack of financial reserves, along
with the high cost of litigation, generic companies will likely have to risk
everything in pursuit of obtaining FDA approval through a Hatch-Waxman
challenge. 182
Considering long-term consumer welfare, the innovative response likely to
result, and the high costs of litigation, a per se approach will be injurious to the
entire pharmaceutical industry. 183 Furthermore, the per se approach will
undermine the courts’ preference for settlement. 184 By highlighting the
problems with this method of analysis, it should be clear that another solution
must be established. 185
2.

Settling Innovation Concerns Through Reverse Payment Settlements

A strong concern for consumer costs leads many to view the high profit
margins in the pharmaceutical industry as a problem that must be addressed.186
It is often overlooked, however, that those high profit margins continue to drive

179. See Butler & Jarosch, supra note 6, at 98 (explaining liquidity cash position of
generic companies). Forcing the high costs of litigation on generic challengers could lead to
other indirect and undesired results. See id. (asserting opposing viewpoint to effects litigation
will have on generic challenges and entry into market).
180. See id. (asserting likely precompetitive results of allowing reverse payments). “A
prohibition on reverse payments in such situations would stifle generic entry.” Id.
181. See Kevin E. Noonan, Generic Defendant Petitions for Certiorari in K-Dur
Litigation, PATENT DOCS: BIOTECH & PHARMA PATENT LAW & NEWS BLOG (Sept. 18,
2012),
http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/generic-defendant-petitions-for-certiora-71606/
(asserting that generic defendant believes generic challenges will be chilled by this approach).
The uncertainty produced by this recent Third Circuit decision will result in a chilling effect
for generic challenges under the Hatch-Waxman Act. See id. (explaining how challenges will
be chilled as result).
182. See Butler & Jarosch, supra note 6, at 97–99 (discussing high costs of litigation
and weak cash positions for generic companies); see also Reverse-Payments Ban Dropped,
supra note 5 (explaining change in economic positioning through pharmaceutical marketplace
that will result from banning reverse payment settlement).
183. See Reverse-Payments Ban Dropped, supra note 5 (asserting how banning reverse
payment settlements would be injurious to healthcare discovery at all levels). If litigation
becomes the only option, generic companies will have less opportunity to challenge patents
and pharmaceutical companies will be forced to expense large amounts to keep patent rights.
See id. (explaining negative effects to all involved).
184. See Schering-Plough Corp. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 402 F.3d 1056, 1072 (11th
Cir. 2005) (asserting judicial policy concerns for favoring settlements). The general policy in
law is to favor settlements to resolve litigation and this is true in patent infringement as well.
See id. (asserting preference for settlement as point courts must address).
185. See Dolin, supra note 7, at 318 (explaining need for better resolution to this
debate). “This lack of agreement in academia, Congress, the courts, and the Executive Branch
leads me to conclude that a new approach is needed . . . .” Id.
186. See PAY-FOR-DELAY, supra note 26, at 4 (asserting strong concern for consumer
costs portrayed through statistical data collected).
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pharmaceutical innovation. 187 With this critical realization in mind, courts
should analyze reverse payment settlements using a method that enables the
pharmaceutical industry to maintain the level of security offered through
exclusionary patent rights. 188
Reverse payment analysis, prior to the K-Dur decision, migrated towards
the scope of the patent test, which allowed courts to consider the exclusionary
rights afforded to a patent holder. 189 This test, or some correlative substitute,
would likely result in the most effective, long-term results. 190 The analysis
should respect the level of exclusion provided by patent law, and courts should
allow mutual settlements that reinforce patent strength. 191 Although costs may
not decrease, branded pharmaceutical manufacturers will be offered the
reassurance needed to move forward with new drug research and
development. 192 By implementing a scope of the patent examination, courts
will ensure general welfare continues to increase through new drug innovation
and consequently a generic chilling effect will be avoided. 193
First, when addressing the general welfare of society, courts must reflect on
the increased utility experienced due to the development of new
medications. 194 The medical field has experienced numerous advancements
187. See Lichtenberg, supra note 177, at 2 (explaining high rate of increase in
longevity of human life). Following an economic study, the only variable found to strongly
correlate with an increase in life expectancy was drug vintage. See id. (asserting importance
of new drug innovation). Drug innovation accounted for almost seventy-five percent of the
increase in life expectancy throughout the studied countries. See id. (explaining strong
statistical data supporting need for future drug innovation).
188. See Hemphill, supra note 9, at 1562–63 (asserting heavy reliance pharmaceutical
companies have on patent policy). “Almost uniquely, in this industry a patent is considered
necessary to recoup an initial investment.” Id. at 1562.
189. See In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323, 1336 (Fed.
Cir. 2008) (affirming scope of patent test as current approach); In re Tamoxifen Citrate
Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 213 (2d Cir. 2006) (asserting analysis to be whether agreement
went beyond scope of patent protection; Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 344 F.3d
1294, 1311 (11th Cir. 2003) (applying scope of patent test).
190. See Butler & Jarosch, supra note 6, at 120 (asserting rule of reason analysis as
best approach). Other analyses, like the per se approach, abbreviate the examination and do
not fully address the issue. See id. (explaining other approaches have errors that deem them
intimately ineffective).
191. See Alison Frankel, 3rd Circuit Shocker: Pay-for-Delay Drug Settlements Are
REUTERS
NEWS
&
INSIGHT
(July
16,
2012),
Illegal,
THOMSON
http://newsandinsight.thomsonreuters.com/Legal/News/2012/07__July/3rd_Circuit_shocker__Pay-for-delay_drug_settlements_are_illegal/ (asserting Judge
Richard Posner’s reasons to enforce patent protection). Patent strength and protection is
needed for pharmaceutical companies to recoup their investments in drug innovation. See id.
(explaining importance of patent protections).
192. See PAY-FOR-DELAY, supra note 26, at 8 (discussing consumer cost differences
between branded drugs and generic alternatives). But see Lichtenberg, supra note 177, at 2
(explaining major benefits to drug innovation and need to keep innovation driving forward).
193. See Lichtenberg, supra note 177, at 2 (explaining clear benefits seen by humanity
in regards to life expectancy and its relation to pharmaceutical innovation); see also Noonan,
supra note 181 (asserting concerns from generic companies regarding likely chilling response
to denying reverse payment settlements).
194. See Lichtenberg, supra note 177, at 3 (discussing study regarding life
expectancy). In the thirty countries studied, pharmaceutical innovation accounted for threefourths of the increase to life expectancy. See id. at 2. (demonstrating major importance of
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directly resulting from costly pharmaceutical innovation. 195 By allowing
parties to settle Hatch-Waxman disputes through reverse payment agreements,
courts will advance a judicial preference for settlement and ensure innovation
for the future. 196
The harsh reality faced in the pharmaceutical industry is that without the
certainty provided through patent protection, manufacturers will have little
incentive to invest in future advancement. 197 The high cost of new drug
development presents a serious risk that must be provided an equivalent reward
when successful. 198 A scope of the patent analysis provides for further patent
protection, while still examining the legality of the settlement. 199 In analyzing
the restraint placed on trade, the scope of the patent test ensures that the reverse
payment settlement does not reach beyond patent law protection. 200 Through
this approach, incentives remain in place that provide the certainty necessary for
branded manufacturers to further pursue the development of new and better
drugs. 201 Furthermore, allowing settlement to preclude litigation in HatchWaxman disputes will have positive effects on generic production as well. 202
continuing pharmaceutical innovation).
195. See id. (explaining direct correlation between life expectancy advancement and
pharmaceutical innovation); see also Frankel, supra note 191 (asserting Judge Richard
Posner’s position on patent protection). “He gave three reasons why drug companies need
patent protection: New drugs cost millions of dollars to develop . . . .” Id. at 1.
196. See Schering-Plough Corp. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 402 F.3d 1056, 1072 (11th
Cir. 2005) (asserting judicial policy in favor of settlement); Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva
Pharms., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1312 (11th Cir. 2003) (discussing reasonable protections
afforded through patent protection that should be respected).
197. See Frankel, supra note 191 (asserting reasons why pharmaceutical companies
need strong patent protection); see also Reverse-Payments Ban Dropped, supra note 5
(discussing negative effects on future innovation that would be seen if reverse payment
settlements were disallowed).
198. See Frankel, supra note 191 (explaining Judge Posner’s support for strong patent
protection). The three main reasons pharmaceutical innovation needs strong patent protection
are the millions of dollars in costs, the inability to collect during the entire life span of the
patent, and the low costs of copying a drug once it is developed. See id. (asserting Judge
Posner’s strongly supported argument for patent protection).
199. See Butler & Jarosch, supra note 6, at 114 (explaining traditional approach
allowing for contextualized analysis of reverse payment settlements). This will allow courts
to learn to differentiate between procompetitive agreements that should be allowed and
anticompetitive agreements, which should not. See id. (asserting functionalism of this
approach).
200. See In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323, 1336 (Fed.
Cir. 2008) (holding that inquiry is whether restriction goes beyond exclusionary scope of
patent); In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 213 (2d Cir. 2006) (concluding
that there is no injury to market as long as competition is restrained within scope of patent);
Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1311–12 (11th Cir. 2003) (asserting
that correct determination was whether settlements effects went beyond scope of protections
offered through patent law).
201.
See Reverse-Payments Ban Dropped, supra note 5 (explaining that
pharmaceutical companies need protection of patents and reverse payments to ensure future
pharmaceutical innovation). Reverse payment settlements allow for certainty in patent
protection, which will result in continued innovation. See id. (asserting importance of
allowing reverse payment settlements).
202. See Noonan, supra note 181 (asserting caution from generic companies because of
possible chilling effect that would result from banning reverse payment settlements); see also
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Turning to generic producers, courts have largely failed to address the
possibility of a chilling effect. 203 A per se approach to examining reverse
payments may hamper the incentive for generic manufacturers to even pursue
Hatch-Waxman challenges. 204 By eliminating the option to agree to a
structured reverse payment settlement, courts attempt to increase the likelihood
of future litigation. 205 Although this may be an objective of the Act, the high
expenses incurred through litigation could nearly bankrupt a smaller generic
manufacturer. 206 By eliminating the option to settle the dispute through a
reverse payment, courts will force generic manufacturers to essentially risk
everything in pursuit of FDA approval through Hatch-Waxman litigation. 207
Alternately, by allowing reverse payment settlements, generic
manufacturers are provided financial gain that can later be reinvested into future
drug development. 208 The scope of the patent test allows both the branded
pharmaceutical companies and the generic manufacturers to mutually achieve
the greatest level of utility through settlement, while still ensuring the restraints
placed on trade do not exceed the exclusionary patent rights. 209 This

Reverse-Payments Ban Dropped, supra note 5 (explaining how reverse payment settlements
provide for future generic entry into market).
203. See Reverse-Payments Ban Dropped, supra note 5 (discussing chilling effect
likely to be experienced by generic manufacturers). With the high cost of litigation, generic
manufactures will likely bring less Hatch-Waxman challenges if reverse payment settlement is
not an option. See id. (asserting concern for generic entry as well).
204. See In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 218 (3d Cir. 2012) (asserting
reverse payment as prima facie evidence of illegality, therefore ruling reverse payment
settlements per se illegal); cf. Reverse-Payments Ban Dropped, supra note 5 (explaining that
without option of settlements with reverse payment, risk of bringing Hatch-Waxman
challenges increases and incentive to file ANDA decreases).
205. See Dolin, supra note 7, at 286–87 (explaining one objective of Act to be more
litigation). The Hatch-Waxman Act was passed in order to encourage more litigation by
providing incentives to generic challengers. See id. (asserting original objectives of Act).
206. See Reverse-Payments Ban Dropped, supra note 5 (examining negative effects
that banning reverse payments would have on generic manufacturers’ availability to bring
Hatch-Waxman challenges); see also Butler & Jarosch, supra note 6, at 98 (explaining
difficult position generic manufacturers with poor cash positions would be put in if reverse
payment settlements were not available).
207. See Asahi Glass Co., Ltd. v. Pentech Pharms., Inc., 289 F. Supp. 2d 986, 994
(N.D. Ill. 2003), dismissed, 104 F. App’x 178 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (explaining how banning
settlements would reduce generic manufacturers’ option to settle and result in less incentive to
bring challenges); cf. Hemphill, supra note 9, at 1575 (explaining that assertion made by
Judge Posner has become relevant in other courts when discussing incentive effects resulting
from disallowing reverse payment settlements).
208. See Butler & Jarosch, supra note 6, at 98 (discussing cash positions of both parties
involved). The generic company often times has less liquidity and the settlements provide the
generic manufacturers with money they need to stay afloat, and also to ensure they can
continue to put drugs into the market. See id. (explaining why reverse payment settlements
help generic manufacturers).
209. See Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1311–12 (11th Cir.
2003) (discussing scope of patent test). The court suggests that only the portions of the
agreement that reached beyond the protections offered by the patent were to be subjected to
antitrust analysis. See id. (explaining what triggers antitrust analysis for reverse payment
settlements); cf. Hemphill, supra note 9, at 1574–75 (explaining that allowing reverse
payment settlements to continue benefits both parties involved).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol58/iss6/5

30

Steinniger: Shortsighted Response to Reverse Payments: How the Third Circuit

118

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW: TOLLE LEGE [Vol. 58: p. 88

conclusion will lead to the most effective and beneficial outcome for society. 210
VI. A CONCLUSION OF SUPREME COURT INTERVENTION
If the Supreme Court affirms this per se approach as the precedent for
analyzing reverse payment settlements, our pharmaceutical industry will
experience detrimental consequences. 211 The conflict among circuit courts has
come full circle with the decision in K-Dur. 212 After analyzing the
contradictory policy concerns advanced by opposing circuit courts, the need for
Supreme Court intervention has become clear. 213
In order to appropriately consider all the implications of a judicial
resolution, it is imperative that the long-term results are addressed. 214 By
allowing reverse payment settlements to serve as a proper resolution to HatchWaxman Act disputes, the Court will ensure future development in the
pharmaceutical industry. 215 After considering innovative incentives, the
general welfare of society, and rights afforded through our essential patent
system, the proper conclusion becomes evident. 216 There is a significant need
210. See Reverse-Payments Ban Dropped, supra note 5 (asserting concern for banning
reverse payment settlements). If courts ban reverse payment settlements through a per se
approach, not only will innovation for branded pharmaceuticals be affected, but generic
alternatives will likely be negatively affected because such a ban will result in less challenges
and a weak position for generic manufacturers. See id. (explaining in detail issues with
banning reverse payment settlements).
211. See id. (discussing harmful effects on all parties if reverse payment settlements
are banned). The branded pharmaceuticals will refrain from further innovation, while the
generic companies will be forced to face lengthy and expensive litigation in order to pursue a
Hatch-Waxman challenge. See id. (describing concerns about banning reverse payment
settlements).
212. See generally In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197 (3d Cir. 2012)
(concerning claims brought against settling parties to Hatch-Waxman disputes).
213. See id. at 210–14 (analyzing most recent reverse payment settlement under
scrutiny); In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323, 1337 (Fed. Cir.
2008) (holding patent to be presumptively valid when analyzing reverse payment settlements);
In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 194 (2d Cir. 2006) (affirming scope of
patent test for analyzing reverse payment settlements); In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig.,
332 F.3d 896 (6th Cir. 2003) (concerning same reverse payment settlement in Andrx); Valley
Drug, 344 F.3d 1294 (turning analysis of reverse payment settlements away from per se
approach); Andrx Pharms., Inc. v. Biovail Corp. Int’l, 256 F.3d 799 (D.C. Cir. 2001)
(discussing first relevant reverse payment agreement).
214. See Reverse-Payments Ban Dropped, supra note 5 (discussing detrimental long
term effects of banning reverse payment settlements). There is a strong concern for both
pharmaceutical innovation and future generic challengers when considering a ban of reverse
payment settlements. See id. (explaining need to refrain from ban).
215. See Butler & Jarosch, supra note 6, at 90 (asserting that reverse payment
settlements directly affect incentives to innovate). Reverse payment settlements extend patent
benefits; therefore, pharmaceutical innovators have more incentive to continue investing in
new drug development. See id. (explaining direct economic relationship); see also ReversePayments Ban Dropped, supra note 5 (condemning idea of banning these valuable reverse
payment settlements).
216. See Reverse-Payments Ban Dropped, supra note 5 (expressing strong belief in
allowing reverse payment settlements). A ban on reverse payment settlements, which the per
se approach essentially casts, would be harmful to the future of our entire pharmaceutical
industry. See id. (asserting strong concern with moving in this direction).
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for resolution, and that resolution is to substantiate the scope of the patent test
as the clear and absolute precedent for analyzing pay-for-delay settlements. 217

217. See Ry Ellison, Reverse Payment Settlement Agreements Likely Headed for
Supreme Court Showdown, WASHINGTON LEGAL FOUNDATION (July 23, 2012),
http://wlflegalpulse.com/2012/07/23/reverse-payment-settlement-agreements-likely-headedfor-supreme-court-showdown/ (discussing likelihood that Third Circuit’s K-Dur decision
could result in Supreme Court resolution). The Supreme Court is faced with a decision to
choose between the views of the Third Circuit and the more reasoned and free-market
approach of the other three circuits. See id. (expressing decision to be made).
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